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ADAPTIVE DISCRIMINATION* 
ELISE C. BODDIE** 
This Article critiques the assumption in constitutional law that 
racial discrimination is siloed, static, and time limited. It argues 
instead that discrimination is systemic, dynamic, and 
intergenerational due to its adaptive nature. The Article sets forth 
a theory of “adaptive discrimination”—that discrimination 
adapts to law and to social norms prohibiting intentional 
discrimination. This process begins with public and private 
efforts to evade antidiscrimination law and persists through 
vehicles of white privilege, racialized class ideologies, and 
implicit biases that embed in facially race-neutral laws and 
practices. These subtler racial processes continuously reproduce 
and entrench racial disadvantage across our social landscapes. 
By explaining how discrimination adapts over time, this theory 
helps to account for the persistence of vast inequality, despite 
formal racial progress under the law. Using cases across different 
civil rights contexts as examples, the Article also identifies and 
critiques time-centered assumptions in constitutional doctrine 
that discrimination “expires,” which further obscure 
discrimination’s adaptive qualities. The Article contends that the 
Supreme Court has relied on these conceptions of time to justify 
the termination of judicial and legislative remedies, allowing 
discrimination to continue unchecked. It proposes changes to 
constitutional law that would curb adaptive discrimination and 
outlines a framework for an enforcement mechanism to match 
discrimination’s endurance and dynamic complexity. 
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“The better we know our racial past, the better we know our 
racial present.” 
   —Joe R. Feagin1 
INTRODUCTION: TOWARD A THEORY OF ADAPTIVE 
DISCRIMINATION 
On August 9, 2014, Michael Brown, an unarmed black teenager, 
was shot to death by a white police officer in Ferguson, Missouri.2 
Brown’s killing, and the grand jury’s subsequent refusal to indict the 
officer responsible for his death, sparked national outrage and 
demonstrations across the country.3 Pundits and advocates alike saw 
the incident as evidence of a pervasive problem of excessive use of 
force by police against black males.4 In the investigative report that 
followed the killing, the U.S. Department of Justice documented 
extensive racial problems with the law enforcement practices of the 
Ferguson Police Department.5 
Yet disparities in policing are just one indicator of the racial 
inequality spread throughout the St. Louis metropolitan area around 
 
 1. JOE R. FEAGIN, THE WHITE RACIAL FRAME: CENTURIES OF RACIAL FRAMING 
AND COUNTER-FRAMING 1 (2d ed. 2013). 
 2. See Tracking the Events in the Wake of Michael Brown’s Shooting, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 24, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/11/09/us/10ferguson-michael-
brown-shooting-grand-jury-darren-wilson.html?_r=0#/#time354_10512 
[https://perma.cc/J3W9-67UR]. 
 3. See, e.g., John Eligon & Manny Fernandez, In Protests from Midwest to Both 
Coasts, Fury Boils Over, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11
/25/us/frustration-months-in-the-making-boils-over-on-the-streets-of-ferguson.html 
[https://perma.cc/UV7N-6P33]; David Dante Troutt, Is Racial Justice Possible in America?, 
THE NATION (Dec. 10, 2014), http://www.thenation.com/article/racial-justice-possible-
america/ [https://perma.cc/5GSU-N7UT]. 
 4. See, e.g., Branden Cobb, Recent Violent Confrontations Between Black Males and 
Police, CBS NEWS (Nov. 24, 2014, 9:31 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/recent-violent-
confrontations-between-Black-males-and-police/ [https://perma.cc/9CXF-H6SX]; Rebecca 
Leber, Police Officers Are More Likely to Shoot Black Men, Studies Suggest, NEW 
REPUBLIC (Aug. 12, 2014), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/119060/michael-brown-
studies-show-racial-bias-police-shootings [https://perma.cc/PZB4-2LRX]; Nina Strochlic, 
The 14 Teens Killed by Cops Since Michael Brown, DAILY BEAST (Nov. 25, 2014, 4:45 
PM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/11/25/the-14-teens-killed-by-cops-since-
michael-brown.html [https://perma.cc/2LBW-EVDT]. 
 5. See generally CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF 
THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT (2015) [hereinafter DOJ REPORT], http://www
.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police
_department_report.pdf	[https://perma.cc/FJ8L-LLLJ] (describing how law enforcement’s 
“focus on revenue” rather than on “public safety needs” led to unconstitutional and 
racially biased practices that fostered community distrust and resentment). 
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Ferguson.6 Many accounts of the racial tragedy begin with Brown’s 
fatal interaction with the police officer.7 But by widening our frame of 
reference and extending it backwards in time, we can also situate 
Brown’s death in a broader social context of longstanding, systemic, 
and dynamic racial subordination.8 In so doing, we learn to appreciate 
the fluidity of racial discrimination and the ways it morphs through 
time across our social, economic, and political landscapes. We can 
see, for instance, how racial disparities in Ferguson’s policing 
practices relate to the city’s segregated schools and majority-white 
municipal power structure, as well as to earlier episodes of housing 
and employment discrimination throughout the greater St. Louis 
metropolitan area.9 Though each of these problems has manifested in 
 
 6. See generally RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, ECON. POLICY INST., THE MAKING OF 
FERGUSON: PUBLIC POLICIES AT THE ROOT OF ITS TROUBLES (2014), http://www.epi.org
/files/2014/making-of-ferguson-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/F3HB-RQBZ] (describing the 
multiple forms and sources of racial inequality in and around Ferguson). I am indebted to 
Rothstein for his thorough analysis of racial discrimination in Ferguson and the 
surrounding area. 
 7. See, e.g., Rachel Clarke & Christopher Lett, What Happened When Michael Brown 
Met Officer Darren Wilson, CNN (Nov. 4, 2014, 5:22 PM), http://www.cnn.com/interactive
/2014/08/us/ferguson-brown-timeline/	[https://perma.cc/8ATY-NSRB]; Laura Santhanam & 
Vanessa Dennis, What Do the Newly Released Witness Statements Tell Us About the Michael 
Brown Shooting?, PBS NEWSHOUR (Nov. 25, 2014, 7:43 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour
/updates/newly-released-witness-testimony-tell-us-michael-brown-shooting/ [https://perma
.cc/GB22-WJLX]; Michael Schwirtz & Richard A. Oppel Jr., Experts Weigh Police Officer’s 
Decisions Leading to Fatal Shooting of Teenager, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2014, at A1; The 
Michael Brown Shooting: The St. Louis Blues, ECONOMIST (Aug. 16, 2014), http://www
.economist.com/news/united-states/21612199-police-kill-unarmed-teenager-sparking-riots-st-
louis-blues [https://perma.cc/4DD9-DCA7]. But see David Von Drehle, The Long, Tangled 
Roots of the Michael Brown Shooting, TIME (Aug. 12, 2014), http://time.com/3104128
/michael-brown-ferguson-cop-shooting-protests/ [https://perma.cc/6686-BEPQ] (discussing 
the history of Ferguson, including zoning laws and boundaries that bred racial inequality). 
 8. See infra Section I.B. I use the term “subordination” to refer to a process formed 
through rules, behaviors, and norms that consistently drives the status quo to racial 
inequality. See Jerome M. Culp, Jr. et al., Subject Unrest, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2435, 2448 
(2003) (distinguishing “discrimination” from “subordination”). 
 9. See infra Section I.B; see also Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 
307–08 (1977) (discussing elements of pattern and practice employment discrimination in 
the hiring of black teachers in St. Louis County); DOJ REPORT, supra note 5, at 2, 9–15 
(describing how revenue-generating pressures on local police and municipal courts led to 
racially biased law enforcement practices); Nikole Hannah-Jones, School Segregation, the 
Continuing Tragedy of Ferguson, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 19, 2014), http://www.propublica.org
/article/ferguson-school-segregation [https://perma.cc/W4DH-85C5]; Jeff Smith, Opinion, 
Black Town, White Power, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014
/08/18/opinion/in-ferguson-black-town-white-power.html [https://perma.cc/YN4N-ULC2] 
(describing racial dynamics that led to Ferguson’s “virtually all-white power structure” 
despite its “majority-black” demographics, and discussing the “economic pressures that 
inflame[d] racial tension” in Ferguson); Ferguson-Florissant School District Data 
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different ways, at different times, and even in different places, this 
Article contends that they are all part of a larger ecosystem of 
discrimination. 
Our limited cognitive abilities often lead us to miss these 
relationships. Social science reveals that the conventional explanation 
of the Ferguson shooting incident, as a problem of policing alone, is 
typical of how we process complex information. Indeed, it is human 
intuition to look for a linear story of cause and effect—a discrete 
event that occurs at an identifiable moment—to explain an outcome.10 
This intuition leads us to couch multifaceted racial problems in more 
simplistic terms.11 By framing discrimination primarily as a problem of 
specific individuals or institutional wrongdoing that manifests itself in 
time-limited ways, law yields to these same impulses.12 
This Article sets forth a theory of adaptive discrimination that 
rejects constitutional law’s linear, time-centered interpretations of 
racial discrimination. Its premise is that racial discrimination adapts to 
the legal and social environment by mutating to evade prohibitions 
against intentional discrimination.13 As it morphs to avoid legal and 
social sanction it spreads across multiple domains.14 The Article 
defines adaptive discrimination as consisting of public and private 
actions and institutional rules and norms that synergistically 
 
Collection, OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (2011), http://ocrdata.ed.gov
/Page?t=d&eid=27900&syk=6&pid=736 [https://perma.cc/KP3Y-94QF] (showing that the 
Ferguson-Florissant School District was 77.1% African-American; 15.6% White; 2.3% 
Hispanic; and 0.6% Asian). See generally Complaint, Mo. State Conference of the 
NAACP v. Ferguson-Florissant Sch. Dist., Civ. No. 14-2077 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 18, 2014) 
(alleging voting discrimination as a result of the at-large election system in the Ferguson-
Florissant School District). 
 10. See John D. Sterman, System Dynamics Modeling: Tools for Learning in a 
Complex World, 43 CAL. MGMT. REV. 8, 11 (2001) [hereinafter Sterman, System 
Dynamics Modeling] (“Where the world is dynamic, evolving, and interconnected, we tend 
to make decisions using mental models that are static, narrow, and reductionist.”). 
 11. See id. (describing individuals’ general tendency to adopt an “event-oriented, 
reactionary approach to problem-solving”). 
 12. See infra Part II. 
 13. See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION 
IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 21 (2010) (“Any candid observer of American racial 
history must acknowledge that racism is highly adaptable. The rules and reasons the 
political system employs to enforce status relations of any kind, including racial hierarchy, 
evolve and change as they are challenged.”). 
 14. See Stephen M. Rich, One Law of Race?, 100 IOWA L. REV. 201, 213–14 (2014) 
(“Race discrimination may be viewed as an interactive system spread across social 
contexts, according to which inequality in one area, such as healthcare or education, fuels 
discrimination in another, such as employment, housing or voting.”). 
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regenerate racial inequality across social systems through time.15 
These “systems,” which I refer to throughout this Article, set the 
stage for racial tragedy, much like the fatal shooting of Michael 
Brown. 
Conceptualizing racial discrimination as adaptive—rather than as 
piecemeal, static, and aberrational—allows us to see it for what it is: a 
living, metastatic disease. Pinpointing the many sources of adaptive 
discrimination, however, is difficult.16 This Article contends that it 
begins with government entities, public and private organizations, and 
individuals who skirt both laws prohibiting intentional discrimination 
and the rules of socially acceptable17 conduct by reconstituting 
discrimination in less overt forms.18 Once reconstituted, 
discrimination persists through ostensibly race-neutral institutional 
rules, laws, and behaviors19 that converge around norms of white 
privilege,20 racialized class ideologies,21 and pervasive implicit racial 
 
 15. See infra Part I. 
 16. Cf. John A. Powell, Race and Class: An Intersectional Perspective, 25 LAW & 
INEQ. 355, 358 (2007) (contending that a “broader, richer understanding of race” should 
look beyond “individual, intentional[, and] unconscious discrimination” to examine 
“cultural meaning, institutional arrangements and their interactions”). 
 17. See infra Part I; FEAGIN, supra note 1, at 89 (“Psychological research has found 
that many white respondents alter comments on racial issues to appear unprejudiced.”); 
see also Aman v. Cort Furniture Rental Corp., 85 F.3d 1074, 1082 (3d Cir. 1996) 
(“Discrimination continues to pollute the social and economic mainstream of American 
life, and is often simply masked in more subtle forms. It has become easier to coat various 
forms of discrimination with the appearance of propriety, or to ascribe some other less 
odious intention to what is in reality discriminatory behavior. In other words, while 
discriminatory conduct persists, violators have learned not to leave the proverbial 
‘smoking gun’ behind.”); Riordan v. Kempiners, 831 F.2d 690, 697 (7th Cir. 1987) 
(“Defendants of even minimal sophistication will neither admit discriminatory animus 
[nor] leave a paper trail demonstrating it.”). 
 18. The dynamics of adaptive discrimination are similar to what Reva Siegel has 
described as “preservation-through-transformation[,]” in which “[e]fforts to reform a 
status regime bring about changes in its rule structure and justificatory rhetoric.” Reva 
Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-
Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1113 (1997).  
 19. See generally DARIA ROITHMAYR, REPRODUCING RACISM: HOW EVERYDAY 
CHOICES LOCK IN WHITE ADVANTAGE (2014) (describing the facially race-neutral social, 
economic, and political processes that reproduce white advantage across generations); 
Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 
107 HARV. L. REV. 1841, 1849–57 (1994) (explaining the role that jurisdictional 
boundaries play in perpetuating racial inequality). 
 20. Cf. Martha R. Mahoney, Segregation, Whiteness, and Transformation, 143 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1659, 1661 (1995) [hereinafter Mahoney, Segregation] (“The construction of race 
in America today allows whiteness to remain a dominant background norm, associated 
with positive qualities, for white people, and it allows unemployment and 
underemployment to seem like natural features of black communities.”). 
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bias.22 These dynamics—which are a function both of discrimination 
that we typically associate with racial “intent” and the passive 
reinforcement of its discriminatory effects—create an equilibrium of 
inequality that continues to deny African Americans, in particular, 
opportunity, status, and power as a group.23 
Understanding racial discrimination as a complex, adaptive 
system—rather than as aberrational or as a historical artifact 
unconnected to present disadvantage—alerts us to its 
multidimensionality and persistence across generations.24 
Appreciating the role that adaptive discrimination plays in structuring 
choices and opportunities also reduces incentives to blame the 
individuals who are trapped by such systems and to focus instead on 
addressing racial harms. 
This Article uses the term “discrimination” to include behavior 
that we conventionally define in terms of racial “intent” and to 
encompass facially race-neutral policies that generate adverse racial 
effects. However, neither of these concepts, under existing 
antidiscrimination law, either alone or together, captures adaptive 
discrimination’s multifaceted nature.25 Intent doctrine focuses on 
 
 21. See generally Martha R. Mahoney, Class and Status in American Law: Race, 
Interest, and the Anti-Transformation Cases, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 799 (2003) [hereinafter 
Mahoney, Class and Status] (examining the complex relationship between race and class). 
 22. See infra Part II. 
 23. Dr. W.E.B. Du Bois predicted the persistence of racial inequality when he 
observed in 1903 that the “color-line” would be the “problem of the Twentieth Century.” 
W.E. BURGHARDT DU BOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK: ESSAYS AND SKETCHES, at vii 
(1903). I focus most of my observations in this Article on the experiences of African 
Americans, the racial group most conventionally identified with racial subordination. See 
Derrick Bell, Racism Is Here to Stay: Now What?, 35 HOW. L.J. 79, 79 (1991) (asserting 
that “[b]lack people will never gain full equality in this country”); cf. FEAGIN, supra note 
1, at 101 (observing that racially subordinating practices tend to be more focused on blacks 
than other people of color). William Julius Wilson prominently argued that class, rather 
than race, accounts for the most persistent disadvantage among African Americans. 
WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE 
UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 112–18, 146–49 (1987). But see Powell, supra note 16, 
at 858 (arguing “that race and class are distinct and at the same time mutually constitutive, 
recursive processes in the United States that render race and class radically incoherent 
without understanding their interactive nature”). 
 24. See Siegel, supra note 18, at 1111 (“Once we recognize that the rules and reasons 
the legal system employs to enforce status relations evolve as they are contested, we ought 
to scrutinize justifications for facially neutral state action with skepticism, knowing that we 
may be rationalizing practices that perpetuate historic forms of stratification, much as 
Plessy v. Ferguson once did.”). 
 25. Cf. FEAGIN, supra note 1, at 3 (“Much recent research on racial matters continues 
to emphasize the prejudice and bias terminology and approach in assessing what are often 
termed racial ‘disparities’	.	.	.	. These concepts, although certainly useful, are far from 
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discrimination, typically thought to result from racial animus,26 
against identifiable persons or groups. Disparate impact addresses 
policies and practices that perpetuate group-based inequality.27 But 
because it primarily reaches discrimination that is specific to a 
particular institution,28 it too obscures the connective relationships 
and dynamic interactions that reproduce racial disadvantage across 
our social landscape.29 
Whatever the statutory limitations of disparate impact under 
federal civil rights law, however, constitutional law is far worse. Equal 
protection precludes discrimination claims based on impact alone,30 
narrowly defines intent,31 and embraces colorblind rationales that 
focus on the presumed harms of racial classifications, rather than on 
the harms of racial subordination.32 Thus, equal protection serves only 
 
sufficient to assess and explain the foundational and systemic racism of the United 
States.”); George Rutherglen, Discrimination and Its Discontents, 81 VA. L. REV. 117, 117 
(1995) (arguing that “the concept of discrimination is at least incomplete and probably 
insufficient to remedy persistent forms of inequality in the workplace”). 
 26. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 298 (1987) (requiring specific intent); 
Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (concluding that “intent” refers to 
conduct taken “because of” and not merely “in spite of” a protected characteristic). But 
see Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 624–26 (1982) (concluding that awareness of adverse 
outcomes was sufficient to invalidate a facially neutral state law that effectively 
disfranchised black voters); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 493 (1977) (advancing an 
effects standard in the context of grand jury selection). 
 27. See Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 
HARV. L. REV. 493, 499 (2003) (noting disparate impact’s implicit focus on “historically 
embedded hierarchies” and group inequality); Rich, supra note 14, at 230 (“Disparate-
impact theory distributes liability on a structural basis, examining the interaction between 
facially neutral conduct and racially identifiable external factors	.	.	.	.”). 
 28. See Charles A. Sullivan, The World Turned Upside Down?: Disparate Impact 
Claims by White Males, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1505, 1561 (2004) (observing that “the plaintiff 
normally has the burden of identifying the specific practice she claims is posing a barrier to 
her group”). 
 29. See infra Section II.A.2. 
 30. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976). But see generally Sheila Foster, 
Intent and Incoherence, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1065 (1998) (discussing the complexity of intent 
doctrine and rebuffing notions that intent operates according to one standard). 
 31. See Foster, supra note 30, at 1079–82 (discussing Castaneda and different 
permutations of the intent standard that allow an inference of intent based on adverse 
racial impact); Primus, supra note 27, at 536; see also, e.g., cases cited supra note 26. See 
generally David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 935, 956–65 (1989) (discussing different conceptions of intent). 
 32. See infra Section II.A; see also Richard Primus, The Future of Disparate Impact, 
108 MICH. L. REV. 1341, 1363 (2010) (describing colorblindness “as the guiding value of 
equal protection”). 
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to redress discrete, individualized discrimination—systemic racial 
inequality is taken as a given.33 
Worse still, constitutional law facilitates adaptive discrimination 
by limiting the power of the federal courts and of Congress to 
dismantle racial discrimination that manifests over time.34 For 
example, the Court has limited the equitable authority of district 
courts to retain jurisdiction over school desegregation cases where 
school districts demonstrate that they have sought in “good faith” to 
eliminate the vestiges of their prior discrimination to a “practicable” 
extent.35 The Court also disabled a key provision of the federal 
Voting Rights Act that curbed discriminatory practices in 
jurisdictions with a longstanding history of racial discrimination.36 
These cases insulate segregation in public schools from judicial review 
and protect voting practices that effectively exclude minority voters 
from the democratic process.37 As a result, public schools in the South 
have become increasingly racially segregated38 and state and local 
elections have been distorted by lack of minority participation.39 In 
short, constitutional law embraces rules that embed discriminatory 
outcomes, with consequential results.40 
Some of these doctrinal choices can be explained by concerns 
about the judiciary’s constitutional authority and institutional 
competence to manage the social forces that extend beyond specific 
 
 33. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 310 (1978) (opinion 
of Powell, J.) (rejecting “societal discrimination” as a constitutional justification for 
affirmative action). 
 34. See infra Section II.C; see also Siegel, supra note 18, at 1111 (“Once we recognize 
that the rules and reasons the legal system employs to enforce status relations evolve as 
they are contested, we ought to scrutinize justifications for facially neutral state action 
with skepticism, knowing that we may be rationalizing practices that perpetuate historic 
forms of stratification, much as Plessy v. Ferguson once did.”). 
 35. See infra Section II.C.2. 
 36. See infra Section II.C.2.  
 37. See infra Section II.C.2. 
 38. See Danielle Holley-Walker, A New Era for Desegregation, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 
423, 431 (2012) (observing that many public schools have resegregated in the wake of the 
Court’s decisions in the early 1990s limiting the power of the federal judiciary in school 
desegregation cases). 
 39. See infra Section I.A.1. 
 40. Although I do not explore it in any depth here, I concede that statutory law may 
be more useful for challenging practices that marginalize people of color due to the 
availability of disparate impact claims against policies and practices that have a 
disproportionate, adverse racial effect. However, even these claims demand that plaintiffs 
identify a causal connection between the challenged practice and the discriminatory effect. 
See, e.g., Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 
2507, 2514 (2015). 
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conduct in discrete cases.41 Institutional deference to state legislative 
processes also partly explains these outcomes.42 Other choices, such as 
the Court’s decisions to strike down race-specific affirmative action 
policies that target pervasive racial inequality, can be attributed to 
colorblindness rationales in equal protection doctrine.43  
This Article points to another explanation for the Court’s 
constrained constitutional interpretations and the deeply flawed 
accounts of racial discrimination that undergird them. It traces the 
Court’s decisions to assumptions that discrimination ceases with the 
passage of time—in other words, that it expires, rather than adapts. 
Our human tendency is to favor simplistic solutions to multifaceted 
problems and then to judge the success (or failure) of these solutions 
prematurely.44 In so doing, we overlook the problem of time lags 
between the implementation of a remedy and the realization of its 
objective.45 Because judges naturally are susceptible to the same 
human instincts, they too are captive to linear thinking. The Court’s 
emphasis on time drives its conclusions that discrimination no longer 
exists at all or that it no longer exists in a form that merits 
constitutional remedy.46 These time-centered notions blind the Court 
to the complex operations that constitute systemic racial 
discrimination, leading it to terminate judicial and legislative 
 
 41. See Rich, supra note 14, at 218–20 (discussing the Court’s decision in Washington 
v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1975), which limited equal protection claims to proof of 
discriminatory purpose due to concerns about the federal judiciary’s institutional capacity 
to manage broader claims and to safeguard separation of powers). 
 42. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 136 (1980); Paul Brest, 
Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 
1971 SUP. CT. REV. 95, 127–28 [hereinafter Brest, Legislative Motive]; Paul Brest, 
Reflections on Motive Review, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1141, 1142 (1978) [hereinafter Brest, 
Reflections] (“If the motives underlying an administrative or a legislative enactment 
should be insulated from judicial review, it must be for institutional rather than 
jurisprudential reasons.”). 
 43. See infra Section II.A.4. 
 44. See John D. Sterman, Communicating Climate Change Risks in a Skeptical World, 
108 CLIMATIC CHANGE 811, 816–18 (2011) [hereinafter Sterman, Climate Change] 
(discussing how misconceptions of time can lead to miscalculations when designing 
remedies). 
 45. Cf. Sterman, System Dynamics Modeling, supra note 10, at 12 tbl.2 (“In complex 
systems cause and effect are distant in time and space while we tend to look for causes 
near the events we seek to explain. Our attention is drawn to the symptoms of difficulty 
rather than the underlying cause. High leverage policies are not obvious.”). 
 46. See infra Section II.C. 
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remedies for discrimination that the Justices perceive (erroneously) 
as long since past.47 
These conceptions of time have long been at the center of the 
Court’s constitutional race jurisprudence, although they have 
surfaced in some cases more explicitly than others. The Court’s use of 
time extends as far back as its decision in the Civil Rights Cases,48 
which invalidated federal antidiscrimination legislation, declaring its 
impatience with civil rights measures less than two decades after the 
Civil War and the formal end of slavery.49 The Court’s focus on time 
has also led it to reject “societal discrimination” as a justification for 
voluntary affirmative action policies.50 
As mentioned earlier, the Court in more recent decades has 
invoked concerns about the length of time that local school districts 
have been subject to court supervision as a basis for ending judicial 
remedies for school desegregation. And it extended similar reasoning 
to Congress’s Section 5 powers under the Fourteenth Amendment in 
Shelby County v. Holder51 when it disabled a core provision of the 
Voting Rights Act.52 The Court objected that the provision—which 
required jurisdictions with a record of discrimination to pre-clear 
voting changes with the federal government—was outdated, as it had 
operated pursuant to the same formula for nearly fifty years.53 This 
Article contends that the Court’s preoccupation with time primed its 
conclusion that the formula no longer captured constitutionally 
cognizable discrimination and that the provision’s continuing 
intrusion on state sovereignty therefore exceeded congressional 
power.54 
All of this raises the obvious question of what we can possibly do 
about racial discrimination given its multidimensionality. Returning 
to the tragic story in the beginning of this Article, one may wonder 
 
 47. See, e.g., Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2642 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (“[T]he Court ignores that ‘what’s past is prologue.’ And ‘[t]hose who cannot 
remember the past are condemned to repeat it.’ Congress was especially mindful of the 
need to reinforce the gains already made and to prevent backsliding.” (internal citations 
omitted) (first quoting WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TEMPEST act 2, sc. 1; and then 
quoting 1 GEORGE SANTAYANA, THE LIFE OF REASON 284 (1905))). 
 48. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
 49. Id. at 24; see also Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Racial Exhaustion, 86 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 917, 922 (2009) (describing the Court’s early impatience with race-based remedies). 
 50. See Hutchinson, supra note 49, at 922. 
 51. 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
 52. Id. at 2631. 
 53. Id. at 2625–31. 
 54. Id. at 2631. 
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how an adaptive understanding helps to prevent or redress the fatal 
shooting of an unarmed black teenager by a police officer. 
Institutional reform of policing practices is an essential and vital 
concern, and I do not intend in any way to diminish its significance 
here. The precepts of adaptive discrimination, however, also urge us 
to explore discrimination’s broader dimensions. They suggest that we 
shift from a singular, transaction-based notion of racial discrimination 
as a form of individual bias, prejudice, and intolerance, and train 
additional attention on the sources and persistence of systemic 
disadvantage.55 Therefore, while we need to dismantle discriminatory 
policing practices, we need also to find ways to eliminate the 
underlying systems that dehumanize black life and create the 
overarching context for fatal encounters like Michael Brown’s. 
In sum, adaptive discrimination enables a more complete 
diagnosis of racial discrimination and encourages us to tackle its full 
dimensions. In so doing, it helps us to reconcile the obvious 
disconnect between formal racial progress, on the one hand—as a 
result of laws that bar intentional discrimination—and the stubborn 
persistence of vast racial inequality on the other.56 It explains how we 
can elect an African-American president and yet still experience 
voter suppression57 and disproportionately high unemployment,58 
 
 55. Cf. FEAGIN, supra note 1, at 2–5 (“Traditional approaches do not capture or 
explain the structural realities of this society’s racial oppression in the past or present.”). 
 56. See Gary Younge, Editorial, The Awkward Truth About Race, THE NATION, June 
9, 2014, at 10 (“[W]hen it comes to the goals laid down by the civil rights movement	.	.	., 
America is actually going backward. Schools are resegregating, legislation is being gutted, 
it’s getting harder to vote, large numbers are being deprived of their basic rights through 
incarceration, and the economic disparities between black and white are growing. In many 
areas, America is becoming more separate and less equal.”). 
 57. See Ian Vandewalker & Keith Gunnar Bentele, Vulnerability in Numbers: Racial 
Composition of the Electorate, Voter Suppression, and the Voting Rights Act, 18 HARV. 
LATINO L. REV. 99, 101–02 (2015); Christopher Ingraham, New Evidence that Voter ID 
Laws ‘Skew Democracy’ in Favor of White Republicans, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (Feb. 
4, 2016) (citing Zoltan Hajnal, Nazita Lajevardi & Lindsay Nielson, Voter Identification 
Laws and the Suppression of Minority Votes (forthcoming 2016), http://pages.ucsd.edu
/~zhajnal/page5/documents/VoterIDLawsandtheSuppressionofMinorityVoters1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/R3Q9-N68T]),	https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/02
/04/new-evidence-that-voter-id-laws-skew-democracy-in-favor-of-white-republicans/ 
[https://perma.cc/R6LZ-AGES] (discussing the findings of a forthcoming study conducted 
by political scientists at the University of California, San Diego and Bucknell University 
exploring the impact that recently enacted voter identification laws are having on minority 
voting). 
 58. See Gillian B. White, Education Gaps Don’t Fully Explain Why Black 
Unemployment Is So High, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 21, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com
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segregation in public schools and housing,59 and significant bias in our 
criminal justice system.60 An adaptive framework enables us to see 
that racial progress is not inevitable but rather that it ebbs and flows 
through time. 
There is an obvious danger, of course, that we may be easily 
overwhelmed both by the complexity and density of the problem and 
the call to respond with solutions that match its persistence and 
intensity. We might choose instead to resign ourselves to hopelessness 
and despair. And yet, understanding racial discrimination as an 
adaptive problem can also be liberating. It suggests that we need 
not—and, indeed, should not—focus on the search for one magical 
approach, but rather should pursue a broad range of coordinated 
strategies. For purposes of law, this means that we should not rely on 
courts alone, but should look to legislatures and communities to 
create an ecosystem of sustained racial equality and freedom. This 
effort would require some meaningful changes in constitutional law, 
which, as it stands now, prevents courts, legislatures, and other public 
institutions from fully capitalizing on their institutional and 
organizational capacities. As I explore a bit further, however, other 
parts of this project could be pursued at the state and local level, 
relatively free of these constitutional constraints. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I is divided into two 
sections. Section I.A defines adaptive discrimination and locates it in 
public and private efforts to evade various civil rights mandates. It 
then explores how a confluence of white privilege, racialized class 
ideologies, and implicit bias embed in our institutions and structures, 
producing a continuum of racial inequality that spans generations. 
Whites’ ability to exit antidiscrimination regimes, coupled with the 
lack of agency that people of color themselves have over 
subordinating systems and law’s assumptions that discrimination 
naturally ceases to exist over time, further exacerbate the problem. 
Section I.B gives a concrete account of adaptive discrimination by 
connecting intergenerational discrimination in St. Louis County to 
 
/business/archive/2015/12/black-white-unemployment-gap/421497/ [https://perma.cc/X4LU-
JP3C]. 
 59. See Erica Frankenberg & Genevieve Siegel-Hawley, Public Decisions and Private 
Choices: Reassessing the School-Housing Segregation Link in the Post-Parents Involved 
Era, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 397, 414–15 (2013) (noting the role that private interests 
play in segregating neighborhoods and schools). 
 60. See DOJ REPORT, supra note 5, at 15–89. 
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present-day discrimination in Ferguson, Missouri, where the fatal 
shooting discussed in this Article’s opening paragraphs occurred. 
Part II explores the problem of time in constitutional doctrine 
and how it subverts an adaptive understanding of racial 
discrimination. Part III proposes changes to constitutional law that 
would free federal courts and Congress to craft strategies for curbing 
adaptive discrimination. This Article concludes by outlining an 
interactive, community-based enforcement mechanism that might 
generate more sustainable change. Ultimately, I am hopeful that law 
can address this problem, but it will require different, more 
innovative structures than those that we have now. 
I.  WHAT IS ADAPTIVE DISCRIMINATION? 
A. The Elements of Adaptive Discrimination: Systemic, Dynamic, 
Regenerative 
Adaptive discrimination consists of public and private actions 
and institutional rules and norms that synergistically regenerate racial 
inequality across social systems through time. This Section explores 
racial discrimination’s historically cyclical nature: formal bans on 
intentional discrimination are followed by episodic retrenchment as 
discrimination is reconstituted in race-neutral forms that more readily 
escape legal sanction, thus allowing the cycle to start anew. 
It is hard to peg this dynamic to a single ideology. Neither racism 
nor white supremacy—as conscious belief systems motivated by racial 
animus—fully captures the dynamic I describe here, though I contend 
that such beliefs have been instrumental to adaptive discrimination. 
That said, society appears to tolerate significant racial inequality,61 
even as it formally rejects overt racism. We can attribute some of this 
problem to a constellation of laws, rules, and practices that converge 
around white privilege norms62 and racialized class ideologies.63 Flying 
below law’s radar, these disguised racial practices and belief systems 
become embedded in our social, economic, and political organizations 
 
 61. Glenn C. Loury, Social Exclusion and Ethnic Groups: The Challenge to 
Economics, in ANNUAL WORLD BANK CONFERENCE ON DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 
1999, at 225, 233, 255 (2000). 
 62. Cf. Mahoney, Segregation, supra note 20, at 1661 (“The construction of race in 
America today allows whiteness to remain a dominant background norm, associated with 
positive qualities, for white people, and it allows unemployment and underemployment to 
seem like natural features of black communities.”). 
 63. See Mahoney, Class and Status, supra note 21, at 799, 828–29 (discussing a 
“dynamic view of class, race, and struggle”). 
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and institutions, producing an equilibrium of lasting racial 
disadvantage.64 A growing body of social science indicates that 
pervasive unconscious bias may also help to explain our high 
tolerance for vast racial disparities.65 
The following sections unpack these points further. Below I 
describe historical examples of evasive strategies that emerged in 
response to antidiscrimination laws. I then discuss how ostensibly 
race-neutral belief systems and whites’ ability to exit 
antidiscrimination regimes perpetuate racial subordination across this 
inherited social landscape. 
1.  Historical Examples of Evasive Strategies 
It may be easy to forget that for a brief but critical period in our 
history blacks enjoyed a significant measure of freedom. During 
Reconstruction, following the Civil War, blacks sought to establish 
their autonomy by assuming control of churches, schools, and 
“benevolent societies,” by “staking a claim to economic 
independence,” and by forging their own “distinctive political 
culture[.]”66 Some blacks achieved prominent political status during 
this time67 and, through significant mobilization, began to “demand[] 
the full gamut of opportunities and privileges enjoyed by whites.”68 
But this period did not last long. New forms of discrimination 
took hold as government officials, in concert with private actors, 
sought to avoid equality mandates.69 The Supreme Court sanctioned 
 
 64. I intend to distinguish the dynamics described here from “path-dependen[t]” 
behavior in which “an outcome or decision is shaped in specific and systematic ways by the 
historical path leading to it.” Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The 
Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 604 
(2001). 
 65. See generally Sheryll Cashin, Shall We Overcome? “Post-Racialism” and Inclusion 
in the 21st Century, 1 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 31, 34–37, 45–46 (2011) (discussing the 
role that implicit biases play in political opposition to integration and policies that 
promote racial equality). 
 66. ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863–
1877, at 78 (1988). 
 67. Id. at 112–13. 
 68. Id. at 113. 
 69. See, e.g., Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 441–43 (1968); see also 
DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME: THE RE-ENSLAVEMENT OF 
BLACK AMERICANS FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR II, at 6 (2008) (describing 
laws and practices that reenslaved African Americans for several decades following 
Reconstruction). The Court reasoned in Jones that 
[j]ust as the Black Codes, enacted after the Civil War to restrict the free exercise 
of those rights, were substitutes for the slave system, so the exclusion of Negroes 
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the resulting laws and practices through early decisions that gutted 
the Reconstruction Amendments.70 
For instance, in United States v. Cruikshank,71 the Court cleared a 
path for whites to use violence and intimidation against black 
majorities in the South.72 The decision enabled whites to seize control 
of state and local governments in order to protect their class interests 
as southern planters.73 In Cruikshank’s wake, state and local 
legislatures passed laws that imposed stringent racial controls on 
black populations.74 Southern states also established peonage systems 
that delivered an estimated 100,000 blacks, charged with 
manufactured “crimes,” into forced labor camps under shockingly 
brutal conditions.75 These harsh and inhumane systems—fostered 
through partnerships between law enforcement and private citizens—
continued well into the twentieth century.76 Thus, for approximately 
fifty years following the Civil War, government officials and private 
actors together effectively reconstituted slavery, which had been 
formally abolished and constitutionally outlawed by the Thirteenth 
Amendment.77 
Whites devised other methods for perpetuating racial caste, 
despite the Reconstruction Amendments’ formal guarantee of racial 
 
from white communities became a substitute for the Black Codes. And when 
racial discrimination herds men into ghettos and makes their ability to buy 
property turn on the color of their skin, then it too is a relic of slavery. 
Jones, 392 U.S. at 441–43. 
 70. Jack M. Balkin, The Reconstruction Power, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1801, 1801 (2010) 
(“The Supreme Court	.	.	.	limit[ed] not only the scope of the Reconstruction Amendments 
but also Congress’s powers to enforce them in decisions like United States v. Cruikshank 
and [the] Civil Rights Cases.”). 
 71. 92 U.S. 542 (1875). 
 72. Id. at 556–57 (striking indictments of whites who were convicted under the 1870 
Enforcement Act for conspiring to intimidate African Americans through murder and 
racial terror). 
 73. See James Gray Pope, Snubbed Landmark: Why United States v. Cruikshank 
(1876) Belongs at the Heart of the American Constitutional Canon, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 385, 388–89 (2014). 
 74. See RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 85 (1997) (observing that 
Black Codes were “[i]ntended to minimize the consequences of the abolition of slavery”). 
 75. See BLACKMON, supra note 69, at 7–8 (describing widespread “quasi-slavery” in 
the twentieth-century South and observing that “the total number of workers caught in 
this net had to have totaled more than a hundred thousand and perhaps more than twice 
that figure”); see also Pope, supra note 73, at 446. 
 76. See BLACKMON, supra note 69, at 5 (noting “how a form of American slavery 
persisted into the twentieth century, embraced by the U.S. economic system and abided at 
all levels of government”). 
 77. Id. at 7. 
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equality. These methods most notably included Jim Crow laws that 
segregated blacks across almost every conceivable geographic and 
spatial dimension.78 The Supreme Court’s notorious decision in Plessy 
v. Ferguson,79 which held that state-mandated segregation did not 
violate the Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection,80 bolstered 
these laws.81 Racial subordination continued to deepen in the latter 
part of the nineteenth century.82 Although constitutional protections 
for African Americans existed in theory, Cruikshank, Plessy, and 
other cases placed these subordinating practices beyond law’s reach.83 
Thus, the constitutional order itself adapted to accommodate racist 
practices.84 
Constitutional law shifted notably in Brown v. Board of 
Education,85 which struck down de jure segregation in public 
education.86 However, southern officials soon organized a campaign 
of concerted resistance.87 In Prince Edward County, Virginia, for 
 
 78. See Elise C. Boddie, Racial Territoriality, 58 UCLA L. REV. 401, 425–34 (2010). 
 79. 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overturned by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 80. Id. at 550–51. 
 81. See Michael J. Klarman, The Plessy Era, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 303, 391 (“Even if 
Plessy did not provide a crucial green flag to the spread of racial segregation, one could 
argue that it legitimized the practice and thus delayed its eventual destruction. On this 
view, Plessy taught the nation that racial segregation comported with the Constitution and 
therefore, implicitly, was not immoral.”). 
 82. Id. at 309 (describing the subordination of blacks in the latter part of the 
nineteenth century, including an increase in lynching, black disenfranchisement through 
literacy tests and poll taxes, the virtual disappearance of integration, the increase in racial 
disparities in public education, the exclusion of blacks from juries, and the enactment of 
“restrictive labor control measures” designed to “coerc[e] black agricultural labor”). 
 83. Indeed, the Plessy Court attributed any inferences of black inferiority to 
misguided assumptions on the part of the “colored race.” Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551 (“We 
consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff’s argument to consist in the assumption that 
the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of 
inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely because 
the colored race chooses to put that construction on it.”). 
 84. See generally Klarman, supra note 81, at 306 (arguing that the Court’s Plessy-era 
decisions reflected both popular opinion and the Justices’ personal views). 
 85. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 86. Id. at 494–95. 
 87. See Mark Tushnet, Public Law Litigation and the Ambiguities of Brown, 61 
FORDHAM L. REV. 23, 24 (1992) (describing various kinds of “resistance,” viz., “passive 
resistance,” “massive resistance,” and “violent resistance”—all characterizing efforts to 
evade Brown’s mandate—and observing that in the aftermath of Brown “some school 
boards developed elaborate schemes of student assignment in which race was not an 
explicit ground of decision, but which effectively delayed desegregation for years”); see 
also, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 17 (1958) (asserting that the constitutional right 
against racial discrimination “can neither be nullified openly and directly by state 
legislators or state executive or judicial officers, nor nullified indirectly by them through 
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example, local officials flouted Brown by closing public schools and 
funding private, white educational academies with public funds.88 
Districts also adopted formally race-neutral “freedom of choice” 
plans that allowed blacks and whites to select the schools they wanted 
to attend—a strategy that, in the grip of whites’ continuing 
commitments to segregation, was guaranteed to preserve racially 
isolated schools in the South.89 Both southern and northern school 
districts also resorted to residence laws that zoned students to schools 
in the racially segregated neighborhoods where they lived.90 Thus, 
despite Brown’s extension of formal constitutional protections, these 
mechanisms entrenched segregation in public education.91 
Government officials used other assorted tactics to circumvent 
integration mandates in the decades after Brown, including efforts to 
preserve residential segregation. One practice was to adopt facially 
 
evasive schemes for segregation whether attempted ‘ingeniously or ingenuously.’	” 
(quoting Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 132 (1940))). 
 88. See Griffin v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 221 (1964) (discussing the use of public 
funds to support all-white private schools); see also Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing 
Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme 
Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1088 (1978) (“The facts of [Griffin] make clear 
that the county intended to maintain a segregated system of public education, attempting 
to insulate the program from constitutional scrutiny by disguising it in an ostensibly 
private form.”). In Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984), abrogated by Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. 
Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014), parents of black public school 
children sought to require the IRS to enforce its nondiscrimination mandate against tax-
exempt private schools. Id. at 766 (holding that “respondents’ complaint, which aims at 
nationwide relief and does not challenge particular identified unlawful IRS actions, alleges 
no connection between the asserted desegregation injury and the challenged IRS conduct 
direct enough to overcome the substantial separation of powers barriers to a suit seeking 
an injunction to reform administrative procedures”); see also Elise C. Boddie, The Sins of 
Innocence in Standing Doctrine, 68 VAND. L. REV. 297, 349–50 (2015). 
 89. See Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 440–42 (1968) (striking down a “freedom 
of choice” plan). 
 90. See MEYER WEINBERG, RACE AND PLACE: A LEGAL HISTORY OF THE 
NEIGHBORHOOD SCHOOL 42–53 (1967) (discussing the racial gerrymandering of 
attendance zones to perpetuate school segregation); John Leubsdorf, Completing the 
Desegregation Remedy, 57 B.U. L. REV. 39, 45 (1977) (discussing the practice of resorting 
to neighborhood schools to evade desegregation). This strategy persisted decades after 
Brown and in the North as well. See Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 269 n.1 (1977) 
(describing the “use of optional attendance zones, racially based transportation of 
schoolchildren, improper creation and alteration of attendance zones, grade structures, 
and feeder school patterns” by the Detroit School Board); City of Yonkers v. U.S. Dep’t 
of Hous. & Urban Dev., 837 F.2d 1181, 1235 (2d Cir. 1987) (concluding that a 
neighborhood-school policy constituted intentional racial discrimination). 
 91. See DAVID DANTE TROUTT, THE PRICE OF PARADISE: THE COSTS OF 
INEQUALITY AND A VISION FOR A MORE EQUITABLE AMERICA 105 (2013) [hereinafter 
PRICE OF PARADISE]. 
94 N.C. L. REV. 1235 (2016) 
2016] ADAPTIVE DISCRIMINATION 1253 
race-neutral zoning laws that effectively precluded affordable housing 
for low-income minorities.92 In Chicago, city officials blocked racially 
integrated units by refusing to adhere to land-use procedures that 
were required for new construction.93 Another tactic was to 
manipulate public transportation so that it bypassed routes likely to 
bring racial minorities into white neighborhoods.94 In addition, local 
officials extended their efforts to preserve segregation in government 
services. In Palmer v. Thompson,95 for instance, the Supreme Court 
upheld a town’s decision to close its public pools after segregation in 
municipal facilities was declared unconstitutional.96 The town 
conceded that an earlier desegregation order had motivated its initial 
decision, but insisted that safety and economic concerns about 
integrated pools justified its refusal to reopen them.97 
In the employment arena, employers resorted to various 
adaptive strategies shortly after civil rights laws banned intentional 
discrimination. These strategies included “intelligence and 
comprehension” tests as screening devices for both hiring and 
promotion.98 These measures did not openly discriminate on the basis 
 
 92. See generally Josh Whitehead, Note, Using Disparate Impact to Strike Down 
Exclusionary Zoning Codes, 33 REAL EST. L.J. 359 (2005) (describing the pervasive use of 
zoning codes that have a racially exclusionary impact). 
 93. See, e.g., Gautreaux v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 503 F.2d 930, 932 (7th Cir. 1974) 
(observing that district court orders mandating affirmative remedies for intentional 
housing segregation were “ignored and frustrated” over an “eight year tortuous course” 
and describing a certain “callousness” of the defendants “towards the rights of the black, 
underprivileged citizens of Chicago that is beyond comprehension”); cf. Spallone v. 
United States, 493 U.S. 265, 279–80 (1990) (imposing sanctions on the City of Yonkers for 
its refusal to pass an ordinance that would allow affordable housing to be sited outside 
predominantly minority areas). 
 94. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 6, at 27–30. But cf. Sch. Dist. v. Missouri, 460 F. Supp. 
421, 444 (W.D. Mo. 1978) (concluding that the alleged use of transportation schemes to 
promote residential segregation was a cognizable litigation theory), dismissed, 592 F.2d 
493 (8th Cir. 1979), aff’d sub nom. Black v. Missouri, 492 F. Supp. 848 (W.D. Mo. 1980). 
 95. 403 U.S. 217 (1971). 
 96. Id. at 226–27. 
 97. See Brest, Legislative Motive, supra note 42, at 97. 
 98. See David J. Garrow, Toward a Definitive History of Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 
67 VAND. L. REV. 197, 212–13 (2014) (explaining that, according to civil rights attorneys at 
the time, “intelligence tests and seniority provisions were ‘the most frequently used means 
of discrimination against minority-group workers’	”); cf., e.g., Sandra F. Sperino, 
Rethinking Discrimination Law, 110 MICH. L. REV. 69, 82 (2011) (“In the first decades 
after Title VII’s enactment, the courts were constantly considering how to shape the law to 
handle new understandings of how discrimination occurs. Since the late 1980s, however, 
the courts have appeared reluctant to adapt discrimination law, despite a growing 
literature suggesting a more complex view of discrimination and its motivations, as well as 
changes occurring in the workplace.”). 
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of race. However, as the Supreme Court recognized in Griggs v. Duke 
Power Co.,99 they achieved the same discriminatory impact, given the 
severe historical deficits in blacks’ educational opportunities.100 
Employers also continued to rely on seniority systems that froze in 
place the effects of prior facial discrimination, leading one judge to 
observe that “[j]ob seniority, embodying as it does, the racially 
determined effects of a biased past, constitutes a form of present 
racial discrimination.”101 
Adaptive discrimination also persisted in voting.102 Government 
officials for generations have resorted to “ingenious” schemes for 
disfranchising racial minorities.103 After laws were enacted that barred 
intentional discrimination, state and local officials concocted new 
methods, such as at-large voting and annexation strategies, to weaken 
minority voting power.104 Indeed, the problem was so persistent that 
Congress passed the Voting Rights Act in 1965, which included a 
provision requiring jurisdictions with a history of repeated racial 
discrimination to pre-clear any voting changes with the federal 
government.105 Examples of adaptive discrimination in voting 
occurred in the wake of the 2008 and 2012 presidential elections that 
led to the election and reelection of President Obama. Following 
 
 99. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
 100. See id. at 426–28 (discussing the shift from overtly discriminatory policy just “prior 
to July 2, 1965, the effective date of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,” to a new policy after the 
effective date for new hires); id. at 428 (“Neither [of the tests] was directed or intended to 
measure the ability to learn to perform a particular job or category of jobs.”). Following 
the enactment of the 1964 Act and the EEOC complaint that gave rise to the litigation, 
Duke Power continued to maintain segregation at its plant. See Garrow, supra note 98, at 
208–09 (describing the segregative practices and the failure of plant employees to 
cooperate with the EEOC investigation). 
 101. See Garrow, supra note 98, at 214. Although some judges recognized these 
“freezing effect[s]” as intentional discrimination, they eventually retreated and began to 
couch them in terms of racial impact. Id. at 215 n.109 (describing one Fifth Circuit judge’s 
apparent shift from describing the “freezing effect” as a form of intentional discrimination 
to “tellingly eliminat[ing] any invocation of purpose” when he described such effects in a 
later opinion). But see In re Birmingham Reverse Discrimination Emp’t Litig., 20 F.3d 
1525, 1541 (11th Cir. 1994) (upholding affirmative action plan on the remedial theory that 
past hiring practices had produced an “adverse impact on blacks”).  
 102. See Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 488 (1903) (observing that constitutional rights 
alone will not protect African Americans from “the great mass of the white population 
[that] intends to keep the blacks from voting”). 
 103. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 328 (1966), abrogated by Shelby 
Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013); ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE 
CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 91–92 (rev. ed. 2009); 
MINORITY VOTE DILUTION 1–27 (Chandler Davidson ed., 1989). 
 104. See infra Part II. 
 105. See infra Part II. 
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these elections, Republican-leaning states passed laws requiring 
photo identification in order to vote,106 with the purpose in some cases 
of preventing racial minorities,107 among other Democratic-leaning 
constituencies, such as college students, from participating in the 
democratic process.108 
The criminal justice system has also undermined civil rights 
successes and racial justice reforms.109 For example, as the civil rights 
movement gained ground during the 1960s, police throughout the 
country began to target law enforcement efforts at inner-city blacks.110 
By 1967, the practice of stopping and frisking blacks “had become 
such a pervasive experience” that the President’s Commission on Law 
Enforcement and the Administration of Justice publicly warned 
 
 106. See Editorial, North Carolina’s Voting Law Goes on Trial, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 
2015, at A26 (describing the state’s voter identification law as “a pile of blatantly 
discriminatory measures that lawmakers knew would make voting harder, if not 
impossible, for many lower-income citizens—who are disproportionately black and 
Latino, and many of whom tend to vote Democratic”); Voter ID History, NAT’L CONF. ST. 
LEGISLATURES (Jan. 4, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/voter
-id-history.aspx [http://perma.cc/5VA3-8WEF]. 
 107. See Deuel Ross, Pouring Old Poison into New Bottles: How Discretion and the 
Discriminatory Administration of Voter ID Laws Recreate Literacy Tests, 45 COLUM. 
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 362, 380 (2014) (“Most tellingly, officials who supported voter ID laws 
or laws restricting early voting as purported anti-fraud measures recently either admitted 
that these laws in fact served racially discriminatory purposes or were exposed as 
purposefully callous to the laws’ discriminatory effects.”). 
 108. See Albert R. Hunt, The Battle to Protect Voting Rights, N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 
2014),	http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/05/us/politics/the-battle-to-protect-voting-rights
.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/2L38-W7FM]; see also Ingraham, supra note 57 (citing Hajnal 
et al., supra note 57) (observing that “[m]ost of the strictest ID laws” were passed after the 
2008 elections and discussing forthcoming political science scholarship by researchers at 
the University of California, San Diego and Bucknell University that identifies 
“	‘substantial drops in turnout for minorities” under these laws, even when controlling for 
other factors). 
 109. See ALEXANDER, supra note 13, at 7–8, 21 (contending that the criminal justice 
system emerged as another form of “social control” to replace the newly retired systems of 
overt discrimination); see also Ian F. Haney López, Post-Racial Racism: Racial 
Stratification and Mass Incarceration in the Age of Obama, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1023, 1026 
(2010) (“Sociologists and political scientists have recently persuasively argued that the rise 
of mass imprisonment reflects a backlash against the civil rights movement.”); cf. 
KENNEDY, supra note 74, at 76–135 (discussing the history of discriminatory law 
enforcement against blacks from slavery through the modern era). 
 110. See ALEXANDER, supra note 13, at 7 (observing that incarceration rates 
“quadrupled” between 1960 and 1990); see also Donna Murch, Ferguson’s Inheritance, 
JACOBIN MAG. (Aug. 5, 2015), http://www.jacobinmag.com/2015/08/ferguson-police-
black-lives-matter/	[https://perma.cc/83LN-PB2B] (observing that heavy-handed policing 
strategies emerged in response to radical black activism during the late 1960s and early 
1970s). 
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about the consequences of these “aggressive” patrol tactics.111 
Hostility between the police and black residents soon escalated and 
was “the precipitating factor” in several major urban riots.112 
The rise of mass incarceration further eroded civil rights progress 
by destabilizing urban communities. The “war on drugs” ensnared 
countless African Americans in the criminal justice system at 
significantly higher rates than whites,113 at a time when drug crimes as 
a whole were declining.114 Felon disfranchisement laws and, in some 
states, the use of gerrymandering techniques that treat prisoners as 
residents of the prison’s jurisdiction, rather than as residents of their 
home communities, continue to undermine African Americans’ 
political power and leverage.115 
In sum, across the civil rights spectrum new policies and practices 
have emerged in place of conventionally racist practices now barred 
by law. Public officials and private actors have skirted social norms 
condemning outright discrimination and have adopted new rules that 
in effect, and by design, reconstitute old patterns of racial 
subordination. The breadth of the problem—which runs the 
institutional gamut, from education and employment to housing, 
voting, and criminal justice—shows how private and public conduct 
feed and reinforce adaptive discrimination across a vast and 
interconnected social system. These practices are both dynamic, as 
 
 111. Lewis R. Katz, Terry v. Ohio at Thirty-Five: A Revisionist View, 74 MISS. L.J. 423, 
460–61 n.152 (2004); see also Farrakhan v. Gregoire, 590 F.3d 989, 994–95 (9th Cir.) 
(discussing police practices of targeting black neighborhoods), aff’d on reh'g, 623 F.3d 990, 
993–94 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (per curiam). 
 112. See Katz, supra note 111, at 436–37 n.77 (“Hostility between blacks and police was 
a major factor—indeed, sometimes the precipitating factor—in several [urban] riots [of the 
1960s].”). 
 113. See ALEXANDER, supra note 13, at 7 (“In some states, Black men have been 
admitted to prison on drug charges at rates twenty to fifty times greater than those of 
White men.”). Studies discredit the notion that the sale and use of drugs explains the 
outcome. Id.; see also, e.g., 1 LLOYD D. JOHNSTON ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., NIH PUB. NO. 07-6205, MONITORING THE FUTURE: NATIONAL SURVEY 
RESULTS ON DRUG USE, 1975–2006, at 32 (2007), http://www.namonitoringthefuture.org
/pubs/monographs/vol1_2006.pdf	[https://perma.cc/BAK4-QMTF]	(“African-American 
12th graders have consistently shown lower usage rates than White 12th graders for most 
drugs, both licit and illicit.”). 
 114. See ALEXANDER, supra note 13, at 7. 
 115. See id. at 6 (discussing racial dimensions of mass incarceration); see also Little v. 
LATFOR, No. 2310/2011, at 8–10 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 1, 2011) (upholding a New York 
prison-based gerrymandering scheme as constitutional); Taja-Nia Y. Henderson, The 
Ironic Promise of the Thirteenth Amendment for Offender Anti-Discrimination Law, 17 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1141, 1148–49 (2013) (discussing the “cumulative ramifications 
of discrimination” against ex-offenders). 
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they change to accommodate new legal rules, and regenerative, as 
they continuously re-create and sustain racial hierarchy. 
2.  White Privilege Norms, Racialized Class Ideologies, and Implicit 
Racial Bias 
The previous Section described discriminatory social practices 
that have survived by evading antidiscrimination law and equality 
mandates. Here, I explore the dynamics of this process in greater 
depth to explain how discrimination persists despite formal bans on 
intentional discrimination and antiracist social norms.116 This inquiry 
first requires that we probe the nature of white privilege and 
racialized ideologies of class. When mapped onto our inherited 
landscapes, these hidden social systems both perpetuate and obscure 
racial inequality. Because they operate in the background, beyond 
our conscious awareness,117 they limit our ability to see and, therefore, 
to define, the problem. In so doing, they facilitate adaptive 
discrimination. 
Martha Mahoney and Peggy McIntosh collectively describe 
“white privilege” as “ ‘an invisible weightless knapsack’ of 
provisions, maps, guides, codebooks, passports, visas, compasses, and 
blank checks.”118 As Mahoney argues, this privilege “facilitates 
mobility and comfort in ordinary life,” the routine benefits of which 
are invisible to whites.119 “Whiteness” here refers to “a ‘standpoint’ 
from which [white] people look at [themselves], at others, and at 
society; and a set of cultural practices that are usually unmarked and 
unnamed.”120 Within this framework, whiteness becomes raceless. As 
the dominant norm, it has no “impact”121 because it defines and, 
therefore, prescribes the natural state of affairs. White privilege thus 
 
 116. See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning 
with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 323 (1987) (observing that society 
“rejects racism as immoral”). 
 117. Cashin, supra note 65, at 34 (“A large body of evidence from experimental 
psychology demonstrates unconscious bias on the part of whites and minorities against 
racial minorities, especially African-Americans. This is in contrast to a dramatic reduction 
in explicit (reported) bias.”). 
 118. Mahoney, Segregation, supra note 20, at 1665 (citing Peggy McIntosh, White 
Privilege and Male Privilege: A Personal Account of Coming to See Correspondences 
Through Work in Women’s Studies 1–2 (Wellesley Coll., Ctr. for Research on Women, 
Working Paper No. 189, 1988)); see also Cashin, supra note 65, at 34. 
 119. Mahoney, Segregation, supra note 20, at 1665. Mahoney writes that “[w]hite 
privilege	.	.	.	includes the ability to not-see whiteness and its privileges.” Id. at 1666. 
 120. Id. at 1664. 
 121. Id. at 1666. 
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fosters adaptive discrimination because it conceals how race operates 
in society. Practices that reinforce whiteness norms are not deemed 
discriminatory because they merely reinforce the accepted, 
established order. 
Take residential segregation, which has persisted for generations 
despite civil rights laws that ban intentional discrimination in the 
housing market.122 Under these laws, it is unlawful to refuse to sell or 
rent a home to an African American because of race. Society also 
formally condemns such practices.123 
But let us assume that a predominantly white town adopts a 
zoning law that effectively prohibits low-income housing. As a result, 
African Americans, who are disproportionately poor, are less likely 
to move into the town. Let us further assume that a group of African-
American plaintiffs sues the town for racial discrimination. Absent 
factors that suggest a racial motive, an equal protection claim is 
unlikely to succeed.124 Indeed, many people may not regard the 
zoning law as racially discriminatory, even though it effectively 
preserves the whiteness of the neighborhood itself.125 White residents 
may even be offended that the town has been accused of racial 
discrimination. The assertion is troubling because it requires whites to 
perceive and to acknowledge both their whiteness and white 
privilege.126 It intrudes upon a state of affairs that they regard 
(however unconsciously) as natural and, therefore, unobjectionable. 
It is possible that the plaintiffs here could ultimately prevail on a 
statutory claim that prohibits policies and practices adversely 
 
 122. See Ford, supra note 19, at 1849–57. 
 123. See Lawrence, supra note 116, at 323.  
 124. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 
(1977). 
 125. For an account of how advantages of neighborhood, wealth, social networks, and 
higher-education admissions can reproduce in the absence of intentional discrimination, 
see ROITHMAYR, supra note 19, at 60–81. 
 126. As Mahoney observes, in this context many whites may not even notice that their 
neighborhoods are entirely white because they are “part of the ‘natural’ world, helping to 
keep their whiteness unnoticed and undisturbed, and helping to equate whiteness with 
something that reflects positive values and feels like home.” Mahoney, Segregation, supra 
note 20, at 1664. In this respect, whites are also unlikely to perceive the whiteness of their 
neighborhood as the legacy of prior government practices that required, and then 
facilitated, segregation. See KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE 
SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES 18 (1987); Barbara J. Flagg, “Was Blind, but 
Now I See”: White Race Consciousness and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 
MICH. L. REV. 953, 976, 982 (1993). 
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affecting people of color.127 But it is far from clear that this kind of 
claim carries the same social stigma as a claim for intentional racial 
discrimination.128 As already indicated, the claim readily lends itself to 
class-based, rather than race-based, justifications. White residents 
may disclaim racial bias by contending that the law does not target 
people of color, but rather only precludes low-income people from 
living in the neighborhood, an outcome that is more socially 
acceptable.129 Blacks have not been excluded from the neighborhood 
because of their race—the response goes—but simply because they do 
not have the income or wealth to buy a house in the area. The real 
problem, therefore, is disparate class resources. With class at the fore 
of the narrative and with its racial dimensions now obscured, white 
residents can comfortably defend their neighborhood as one that only 
“happens-to-be-white,” rather than one that is intentionally white. In 
this way, the whiteness of the neighborhood retains its legitimacy 
under the law and its immunity from social sanction.130 
These racialized class ideologies—which are explicitly associated 
with class, but correlate with race—foster adaptive discrimination.131 
Race is operative because these ideologies often have a 
disproportionately adverse racial impact, though not necessarily in 
ways that are detectible by law or by our social radar.132 The zoning 
 
 127. Such a zoning law may violate the Fair Housing Act under a “disparate impact” 
theory of liability. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 
Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2525–26 (2015). 
 128. Cf. Mahoney, Class and Status, supra note 21, at 801 (describing efforts to assert 
class in order to avoid discussions of racial inequality). 
 129. Id.; cf. Mahoney, Segregation, supra note 20, at 1667–68 (observing how white 
“elites” manipulate racial narratives to blame less-elite whites for racism, while 
“exonerat[ing] [themselves] from responsibility for the reproduction of racial power and 
subordination”). 
 130. We could complicate the hypothetical to show that white residents approved the 
zoning law out of a desire to preclude poor blacks—not necessarily poor whites—from 
moving in. Indeed, studies indicate that low-income whites on average live in wealthier 
neighborhoods than middle-class blacks, suggesting that class itself is racialized. See 
Tami Luhby, Middle Class Whites Live in Nicer Neighborhoods Than Blacks, CNN 
MONEY (June 26, 2015),	 http://money.cnn.com/2015/06/26/news/economy/middle-class-
neighborhoods/	 [https://perma.cc/TJ74-U2UJ]	 (reviewing a study conducted by the 
Stanford Graduate School of Education). 
 131. See Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: 
Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 
1360–64, 1369–81, 1384 (1988) (observing that “until the distinct racial nature of class 
ideology is [] revealed and debunked, nothing can be done about the underlying structural 
problems that account for the disparities”). 
 132. See generally United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1185–86 (8th Cir. 
1974) (explaining that a plaintiff can establish a rebuttable presumption of a valid Title 
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law disproportionately isolates and contains blacks, but constitutional 
law privileges and legitimizes the class-based explanation and 
therefore insulates its racial dimensions from scrutiny. Even an 
otherwise successful statutory claim, brought under the disparate 
impact theory alluded to above, may run into constitutional trouble if 
it advances an explicit racial remedy.133 As a result, the constitutional 
narrative disguises these racial dynamics, even as it tolerates their 
racial effects, allowing them to fester and to corrode equality. 
Pervasive implicit racial bias further complicates the problem, as 
it generates racial reactions that may be unknown even to the 
individual who harbors them.134 As Charles Lawrence has explained, 
this lack of awareness can be traced to cognitive processes that refuse 
to acknowledge “ideas, wishes, and beliefs that conflict with what the 
individual has learned is good or right.”135 People cannot detect their 
racial bias because their minds have blocked their ability to recognize 
it.136 The social dominance of widely accepted “beliefs and 
preferences” about African Americans and other people of color 
further obscures their racial dimensions.137 Identifying and labeling 
these beliefs is more difficult when they function as “part of the 
individual’s rational ordering of her perceptions of the world[,]”138 
rather than being understood as an explicit choice about what to think 
and how to act. This disconnect between an individual’s hidden 
understandings and sociocultural norms on the one hand, and the 
racialized impact of on-the-ground practices on the other, helps to 
perpetuate the status quo. If we cannot recognize the problem, we 
cannot begin to address it. 
 
VIII disparate impact claim based on a showing of discriminatory effect where a city 
justified a discriminatory zoning ordinance on the grounds that dispersed low-income 
housing would devalue neighboring homes). 
 133. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. 
Ct. 2507, 2512 (2015) (“Remedial orders that impose racial targets or quotas might raise 
difficult constitutional questions.”). 
 134. See generally MAHZARIN R. BANAJI & ANTHONY G. GREENWALD, BLINDSPOT: 
HIDDEN BIASES OF GOOD PEOPLE (2013) (observing that many people harbor hidden 
biases of which they are unaware); Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing Through 
Colorblindness: Implicit Bias and the Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 465, 468–90 (2010) 
(discussing peer-reviewed studies that document the prevalence of implicit bias). 
 135. See Lawrence, supra note 116, at 322 (discussing a Freudian rationale “for the 
unconscious nature of	.	.	.	racially discriminatory beliefs and ideas”). 
 136. See id. at 322–23 (observing that “while our historical experience has made racism 
an integral part of our culture, our society has more recently embraced an ideal that 
rejects racism as immoral”). 
 137. See id. at 323. 
 138. Id. 
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3.  The Ability to Exit Antidiscrimination Regimes 
The previous Section explored how inherently discriminatory 
individual and sociocultural beliefs, disguised as racially neutral 
adherence to the status quo, perpetuate racially unequal outcomes. 
This Section assembles these discrete observations to make explicit a 
core aspect of adaptive discrimination—whites’ ability to “exit” or 
withdraw from antidiscrimination or equality-oriented regimes139 by 
resorting to alternatives outside the “official system.”140 As indicated 
above, these alternatives can include private schooling arrangements 
and changes in hiring and promotion techniques, policing and law 
enforcement practices, and methods for qualifying voters that avoid 
antidiscrimination mandates. 
These insights draw on Marc Galanter’s seminal article about the 
dynamics in our legal system that favor the “haves” (over the “have-
nots”).141 Galanter identified features of the “architecture of the legal 
system” that limit law’s use as a tool for redistributive social 
change.142 One important feature of this architecture is the ability of 
those with resources to opt out of social systems that no longer serve 
their needs or satisfy their preferences and to opt into alternative 
institutional arrangements that allow them to pursue their goals using 
different means. 
In an adaptive context, whites’ capacity to exit antidiscrimination 
regimes increases as alternative institutional structures and partners 
become available and as “the costs of withdrawal, transfer, relocation, 
development of new relationships, [and] the pull of loyalty to 
previous arrangements” diminish.143 As indicated above, exiting 
integrated institutions is relatively costless for whites due to belief 
systems, norms, behaviors, and latent biases that tolerate, or at least 
fail to stigmatize, the resulting racial inequality. 
Take the example of public school integration. Although 
research shows that whites have become more accepting of 
 
 139. See Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits 
of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 124 (1974); cf. Paul C. Gewirtz, Remedies and 
Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 629–30 (1983) (noting that “[w]hites who object to 
integration in a city’s public schools and who have the flexibility and the resources may 
decide to ‘flee’ by sending their children to private schools or by choosing to live in 
another community”). 
 140. See Gewirtz, supra note 139, at 629–30; see also Galanter, supra note 139, at 124–
35. 
 141. See Galanter, supra note 139, at 136–51. 
 142. Id. at 149. 
 143. Id. at 126. 
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integration over time, the same research shows that they are still 
generally uncomfortable with it.144 Whites are more inclined to leave a 
public school as the number of “nonwhite” children in the school 
increases.145 Indeed, “white flight” from integrating public schools has 
long been a barrier to school integration.146 
However, whites can only leave a racially integrated school if 
they have an alternative school to attend. Private schools, charter 
schools, and public schools in predominantly white school districts 
provide white parents with options for avoiding integration. As 
discussed in Part II, law enables whites to “exit” public school 
integration by protecting their decision to exercise choice over these 
and other alternative educational environments.147 
At the same time, the social and emotional costs of equality 
mandates can be high if they require whites to confront white 
privilege, to acknowledge the racialized dimensions of class that 
preserve such privilege, and to identify biases that linger beneath 
their conscious awareness. As a result, whites may more readily resort 
to systems that operate according to “parochial norms and concerns” 
outside the bounds of antidiscrimination law, including the right to 
exclude persons of perceived “low status.”148 In the context of school 
integration, this can lead whites to identify concerns, such as 
 
 144. See Camille Zubrinsky Charles, Can We Live Together? Racial Preferences and 
Neighborhood Outcomes, in THE GEOGRAPHY OF OPPORTUNITY 45, 56 (Xavier de Souza 
Briggs ed., 2005). 
 145. See Kimberly Goyette, Setting the Context (“More recent research on the effects 
of school choice on school segregation finds that the proportion of nonwhite students in 
public schools affects the likelihood of white enrollment in private, charter, and magnet 
schools, even when controlling for measures of school quality, including graduation rates, 
test scores, safety, and student-teacher ratios.”), in CHOOSING HOMES, CHOOSING 
SCHOOLS 1, 8–9 (Annette Lareau & Kimberly Goyette eds., 2014). 
 146. See Janelle Scott, School Choice as a Civil Right: The Political Construction of a 
Claim and Its Implications for School Desegregation (“During the civil rights movement, 
choice became a controversial and popular tool for policy makers who wished to defy 
Brown’s mandate to desegregate public schools by providing ‘multiple escape routes’ for 
white students.”), in INTEGRATING SCHOOLS IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 32, 37 (2011); see 
also, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 753 (1984) (rejecting a challenge by the parents of 
black school children linking the integration of public schools to the failure of the IRS to 
deny tax exemptions to racially discriminatory public schools), abrogated by Lexmark 
Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014); Gewirtz, supra note 
139, at 629–30. 
 147. See infra Part II. 
 148. See, e.g., Klint Alexander & Kern Alexander, Vouchers and the Privatization of 
American Education: Justifying Racial Resegregation from Brown to Zelman, 2004 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 1131, 1137–41 (discussing the historical use of school vouchers to enable whites to 
escape the mandate to integrate under Brown); cf. Galanter, supra note 139, at 146. 
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perception of a school’s level of “safety,” that are not (explicitly) 
racial in order to avoid appearances of racial bias.149 
These antidiscrimination mandates, in other words, seek to 
reconfigure systems that entrench inequality. Yet, the call to shift 
from a status quo that feels natural, ordinary, and customary, to 
circumstances that are different and uncomfortable, incentivizes 
exit.150 Whites who fear difference have both opportunity and motive, 
both individually and as a group, to adopt behaviors and policies that 
allow them to opt out of equality mandates, free from either social or 
legal censure. 
4.  The Problems of Agency and Time 
Two additional points warrant mention here, as they further 
illustrate how our social and legal understandings fail to cohere with 
the realities of racial discrimination. 
The first of these issues concerns agency. Adaptive 
discrimination presumes that racially subordinated people have very 
little, if any, agency or control over the dynamic systems that 
perpetuate racial inequality. For many, this idea will seem 
fundamentally antithetical to America’s individualist ethos.151 The 
notion that anyone lacks control over her environment may make 
little sense. To see why this intuition misses the mark in the race 
context, however, requires a practical understanding of the powerful 
forces that are often arrayed against people of color.152 
We can return to the earlier example of the predominantly white 
town that has passed a zoning ordinance precluding affordable 
housing. Once again, chances are that an African American will have 
a harder time buying into or renting in the town because she is more 
 
 149. This American Life: The Problem We All Live With, CHI. PUB. RADIO (July 31, 
2015),	http://m.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/562/the-problem-we-all-live-
with [http://perma.cc/7W7Y-YCCF] (reporting on white parents’ opposition to integration 
under the auspices of “school safety” in a predominantly white town in Missouri). 
 150. Indeed, Galanter posits that groups resort to law precisely because they are 
excluded from the system of relationships that might allow them to redress their 
grievances privately. See Galanter, supra note 139, at 130 (“[T]he more inclusive in life-
space and temporal span a relationship between parties, the less likely it is that those 
parties will resort to the official [legal] system and more likely that the relationship will be 
regulated by some independent ‘private’ system.”); see also, e.g., Alexander & Alexander, 
supra note 148, at 1137–41. 
 151. Cf. Tracy E. Higgins & Laura A. Rosenbury, Agency, Equality, and 
Antidiscrimination Law, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1194, 1194–98 (2000) (discussing the 
presumption that individual exercises agency over discrimination). 
 152. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 6, at 4. 
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likely to be lower income.153 She also likely has far less wealth (which 
she might otherwise use to supplement her low income) than whites 
in the town,154 increasing the improbability of such a move. If she 
grew up in a racially segregated school district, there is a good chance 
that she will have trouble finding the kind of decent-paying job that 
would eventually enable her to move into the town.155 If she lives in 
an urban environment, it may be more difficult for her to leave, given 
the array of social, environmental, and economic factors that degrade 
her choices and opportunities.156 In short, she is trapped at almost 
every turn by a system that denies her upward mobility and access to 
a better life.157 
These racial dynamics point to a central problem that underlies 
adaptive discrimination: “the structure of the system gives rise to its 
behavior.”158 This means that the choices exercised by people within 
the system are shaped by the system itself and that even people who 
may be very different from each other will still “behave in similar 
ways.”159 Understanding these dynamics helps us to resist the problem 
 
 153. See PATRICK SHARKEY, STUCK IN PLACE: URBAN NEIGHBORHOODS AND THE 
END OF PROGRESS TOWARD RACIAL EQUALITY 4 (2013) (observing that at the end of 
the 2000s approximately seventy-eight percent of African Americans “were in the bottom 
three-fifths of the non-immigrant income distribution” in the United States). 
 154. Id. at 112 (noting that “African Americans still have 40 percent less wealth” than 
whites after “adjusting for parents’ education, income, and occupation”); see also HEATHER 
BETH JOHNSON, THE AMERICAN DREAM AND THE POWER OF WEALTH: CHOOSING 
SCHOOLS AND INHERITING INEQUALITY IN THE LAND OF OPPORTUNITY 1–9 (2006); 
ROITHMAYR, supra note 19, at 67 (“Residents of segregated neighborhoods own smaller and 
older properties worth much less, and accordingly are far less likely to pass down money for 
a college education or a housing down payment to the next generation.”). 
 155. See ERICA FRANKENBERG, CHUNGMEI LEE & GARY ORFIELD, CIVIL RIGHTS 
PROJECT, A MULTIRACIAL SOCIETY WITH SEGREGATED SCHOOLS: ARE WE LOSING THE 
DREAM? 5 (2003),	http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/integration-and-
diversity/a-multiracial-society-with-segregated-schools-are-we-losing-the-dream/frankenberg
-multiracial-society-losing-the-dream.pdf	[http://perma.cc/R22Y-V3MH]	 (describing 
“apartheid schools”—intensely segregated schools with “enormous poverty, limited 
resources, and social and health problems of many types”—that “educate one-sixth of the 
nation’s black students and one-fourth of black students in the Northeast and Midwest”); 
ROITHMAYR, supra note 19, at 65 (discussing the employment advantages of (predominantly 
white) wealthy parents who “pass on” employment opportunities to their children). 
 156. See SHARKEY, supra note 153, at 2–5, 180. 
 157. The consequences of this severely depressed opportunity are intergenerational. 
See id. at 2 (“It is common to hear about the continuing expansion of the black middle 
class	.	.	.	[but] while there is a slightly greater presence of African Americans in the middle 
and the high ends of the income distribution, a close look at the data shows that the 
overall level of economic advancement among African Americans [since the beginning of 
the 1970s] has been remarkably limited.”). 
 158. See Sterman, System Dynamics Modeling, supra note 10, at 16. 
 159. Id. 
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of “fundamental attribution error.”160 This problem refers to the 
mistaken judgments that arise when system participants fail to take 
account of how systems structure human responses.161 We attribute 
these responses to “dispositional rather than situational factors[,]” 
and to “character flaws	.	.	.	rather than to the system in which the[] 
people are embedded.”162 Our protagonist in the preceding paragraph 
is no less hardworking or innately capable than the white residents of 
the town, but her freedom to make different choices has been 
severely constrained due to factors beyond her control that have 
accumulated and regenerated for decades.163 
We might draw on the same insights to explain whites’ 
preferences for predominantly white neighborhoods, which were 
described earlier. One view is that these preferences are 
“dispositional”—that is, that whites somehow innately prefer all-
white environments.164 Alternatively, we can view these preferences 
as “situational,”165 meaning that whites have been conditioned to 
avoid blacks as a result of policies and practices handed down over a 
period of several hundred years. The perception that whites are 
inherently racist is a fundamental attribution error, because it fails to 
consider that they too are a product of the social environment, 
historical context, and overarching structure of racial discrimination. 
The difference between dispositional and situational 
explanations may lead us to more optimistic conclusions about 
adaptive discrimination and the possibilities for addressing it, which I 
turn to briefly in Part III. On the former view, there may not be much 
that law can do to change whites’ “predisposition” to oppose 
integration, especially if that predisposition is reinforced by other 
component parts of a pervasively discriminatory system. The latter 
view, however, suggests that we might change whites’ receptivity to 
 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. (“A fundamental principle of system dynamics states that the structure of the 
system gives rise to its behavior.”). 
 162. Id.; cf. Gary Blasi & John T. Jost, System Justification Theory and Research: 
Implications for Law, Legal Advocacy, and Social Justice, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1119, 1124 
(2006) (discussing how people adapt to subordination). 
 163. See Crenshaw, supra note 131, at 1357 (“Black people do not create their 
oppressive worlds moment to moment but rather are coerced into living in worlds created 
and maintained by others.”). 
 164. Sterman, System Dynamics Modeling, supra note 10, at 16 (“[P]eople have a 
strong tendency to attribute the behavior of others to dispositional rather than situational 
factors—that is, to character (and, in particular, character flaws) rather than to the system 
in which these people are embedded.”). 
 165. Id. 
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integration if we could just get them to try it by altering the 
underlying structural context. 
The second issue relevant to an understanding of adaptive 
discrimination concerns the heuristic of time. Our human tendency is 
to favor simplistic solutions to multifaceted problems and then to 
judge the success (or failure) of these solutions prematurely.166 Yet 
these cognitive shortcuts can lead us to ignore the fluidity and 
complexity of our predicaments167 and to overlook the problem of 
time lags that inhere in adaptive discrimination due to active and 
passive resistance to antidiscrimination mandates.168 Accordingly, we 
presume that racial discrimination necessarily subsides with time,169 
which in turn generates unrealistic expectations about what can be 
achieved within a limited time horizon. Because we have yet to learn 
these lessons, we are often deceived by the passage of time in the 
context of race. 
To understand this point better, we can analogize racial 
discrimination to human disease. Let us say we have a rash. When we 
apply medication to our rash, we expect that it will heal with time. 
But what if the rash really is a symptom of a more systemic malady, 
such as cancer, that has spread throughout the body? Time can only 
“heal” the wound if we have correctly diagnosed the problem and 
applied the correct medication for a long enough period to treat the 
underlying condition. This might require that we change the 
medication as the disease itself spreads and assumes different forms. 
In other words, we cannot depend on time alone to tell us whether we 
are cured. Time does not inevitably lead to improvement if we 
misunderstand the problem. In fact, if anything, time can exacerbate 
the problem if we leave the malady untreated. 
Understanding both the role that dynamic systems play in 
structuring individual behavior and the limits of time as a proxy for 
 
 166. Sterman, Climate Change, supra note 44, at 816–17 (discussing how 
misconceptions of time lead to miscalculations in fashioning remedies). 
 167. See Sterman, System Dynamics Modeling, supra note 10, at 16 (“The heuristics we 
use to judge causal relationships systematically lead to cognitive maps that ignore 
feedbacks, nonlinearities, time delays, and other elements of dynamic complexity.”). 
 168. Cf. id. at 12 tbl.2 (“In complex systems cause and effect are distant in time and 
space while we tend to look for causes near the events we seek to explain. Our attention is 
drawn to the symptoms of difficulty rather than the underlying cause. High leverage 
policies are often not obvious.”). 
 169. See FEAGIN, supra note 1, at 5 (critiquing the scholarly approach that “typically 
views the race problem as not foundational to society, but as temporary and gradually 
disappearing as a result perhaps of increasing modernity”). 
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racial progress deepens our understanding of racial discrimination. 
Actuated through events set in motion long ago, discrimination can 
surface in new places and forms and may breed consequences that are 
not perceived for years, even generations. As a result, the true impact 
of racial discrimination—and the remedies that we design to redress 
it—may take some time to fully unfold. Appreciating the many 
dimensions of this problem requires that we reformulate our 
assumptions about how long it takes to dislodge discrimination that 
has been hardwired over generations. This in turn requires that we 
adapt our time horizons for realizing meaningful social change. We 
have to match the dynamic complexity of racial discrimination with 
systemic responses that are equally dynamic and adaptive. 
 As Part II explains below, constitutional doctrine consistently 
misdiagnoses the problem of racial discrimination. Its heavy reliance 
on time as a proxy leads courts to terminate remedial measures 
prematurely on the assumption that they have outlived their 
usefulness. Because judges presume that racial discrimination 
expires—rather than acknowledging that it adapts—they also 
presume that racial discrimination from “long ago” is no longer 
constitutionally relevant. In this regard, they miss how present-day 
racial disparities were operationalized and embedded in our social 
landscapes by past discrimination.  
B. A Practical Account of Adaptive Discrimination 
Here is a quick test. What do the following have in common: a 
racial zoning law struck down by the Supreme Court in 1917, the 1972 
demolition of the Pruitt-Igoe housing projects in St. Louis, and the 
2014 shooting death of an unarmed black teenager by a white police 
officer, mentioned in the opening paragraphs of this Article? The 
answer is that together they illustrate adaptive discrimination as it 
stretches through time to regenerate racial inequality. This Section 
illustrates how systems that were designed to evade and subvert 
antidiscrimination law created the supervening conditions for the 
fatal encounter between the teenager and the Ferguson police officer. 
Because we tend to perceive racial discrimination in subject-driven 
frames, these examples help us understand racial discrimination as a 
subordinating system that adapts as new legal regimes take effect. It 
also allows us to appreciate the connection between and among 
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different forms of discrimination and how they persist from the past 
to the present.170 
We can start this narrative in 1917. In an earlier period, St. Louis, 
like so many places around the country,171 had racial zoning 
ordinances that prohibited blacks from moving into predominantly 
white areas.172 However, in 1917, the Supreme Court declared these 
policies unconstitutional in Buchanan v. Warley.173 Undeterred by the 
Court’s ruling, St. Louis concocted another approach.174 It removed 
overt references to race in its zoning laws and adopted rules that 
designated single-family residential housing for the virtually all-white 
areas of the city, while prohibiting other uses that blacks (who were 
disproportionately poor) could afford.175 Deed restrictions on private 
property that barred blacks from moving in176 helped to effectuate the 
scheme.177 Thus, under the guise of municipal laws that were 
ostensibly race-neutral, city officials—in concert with private 
parties—created and perpetuated racial segregation that would not 
readily be detected by law.178 
Having purposefully created white neighborhoods, city planners 
then manipulated zoning rules to ensure that the least desirable uses 
of land, such as “taverns, liquor stores, nightclubs, and houses of 
prostitution”179 would be located next to, or in, black 
 
 170. Many of my examples are rooted in a black-white paradigm. By using these 
examples, I do not intend to exclude other people of color from my analysis. Rather, I use 
this paradigm only to illustrate the core, historical functionality of racial discrimination. 
 171. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 6, at 7; REYNOLDS FARLEY, SHELDON DANZIGER & 
HARRY J. HOLZER, DETROIT DIVIDED 145–48 (2000). 
 172. Id. at 7. 
 173. 245 U.S. 60, 82 (1917) (striking down a racial zoning ordinance on due process 
grounds). 
 174. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 6, at 7. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at 14 (describing public entanglement in racially restrictive covenants). 
 177. Id. at 7, 12–15. The first such restrictive covenant was recorded in St. Louis in 
1910. Id. at 13. These restrictive covenants operated with legal sanction until Shelley v. 
Kraemer declared them constitutionally unenforceable in 1948. 334 U.S. 1, 22–23 (1948). 
However, the use of such covenants persisted in many jurisdictions for decades. See 
JACKSON, supra note 126, at 201–15. 
 178. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 6, at 7 (“[St. Louis] developed these new rules with racial 
purposes unhidden, although race was not written into the text of the zoning rules 
themselves.”). 
 179. Id. at 9; see also FARLEY ET AL., supra note 171, at 146; BERYL SATTER, FAMILY 
PROPERTIES: RACE, REAL ESTATE, AND THE EXPLOITATION OF BLACK AMERICA 6 
(2010) (attributing the decline of “many black urban neighborhoods” to exploitative real 
estate practices that preyed on “hard-pressed but hard-working and ambitious African 
Americans”). 
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neighborhoods.180 Because of these practices, many homes owned or 
rented by blacks were ineligible for federally backed mortgages, many 
of which included underwriting policies that prohibited federal 
guarantees for properties located next to “inharmonious uses.”181 
While undermining middle-class investment in black 
neighborhoods, federal policy also concentrated racialized poverty in 
central cities. This effort began in St. Louis through the intentional 
destruction of racially integrated communities.182 In the early 1950s, 
the city began to build the Pruitt-Igoe towers, high-rise projects 
designated to house poor blacks.183 A decade later, Pruitt-Igoe 
“became a national symbol of dysfunctional public housing.”184 The 
terrible social conditions, combined with the city’s neglect of the 
housing project’s physical plant, made tenant life “untenable.”185 The 
conditions became so bad that beginning in 1972, the federal 
government “evicted all residents and dynamited the 33 towers.”186 
As government policies pushed poor blacks into the central city, 
the Federal Housing Administration opened homeownership 
opportunities exclusively for whites in the suburbs.187 Federal 
investment in white communities in turn spurred significant private 
investment.188 These racialized patterns of public and private 
disinvestment deepened the racial divide across the St. Louis 
metropolitan area,189 with the city’s north side becoming identifiably 
black, and the south side identifiably white.190 The economic impact 
 
 180. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 6, at 7–9. 
 181. Id. at 15 (“Beginning in 1934, and continuing thereafter, [Federal Housing 
Administration] underwriting manuals stated that ‘protection against some adverse 
influences is obtained by the proper zoning and deed restrictions that prevail in the 
neighborhood’ and elaborated that ‘the more important among the adverse influential 
factors are the ingress of undesirable racial or nationality groups.’	”). Real estate owners 
took advantage of the high demand for black housing and limited supply to warehouse 
blacks in “racial ghettos,” where they were forced to pay exorbitant sums for dilapidated 
units. FARLEY ET AL., supra note 171, at 146; ALLAN H. SPEAR, BLACK CHICAGO: THE 
MAKING OF A NEGRO GHETTO, 1890–1920, at 91–111 (1967). 
 182. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 6, at 10–12 (discussing efforts to destroy integrated 
neighborhoods). 
 183. Id. at 12. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. See JACKSON, supra note 126, at 203–15; ROTHSTEIN, supra note 6, at 12 
(describing purposeful segregation in federal public housing policy). 
 188. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 6, at 14–19. 
 189. Id. at 15. 
 190. Id.  
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of this racial segregation was striking. The precipitous decline of black 
neighborhoods was matched only by the upswing in public investment 
in white neighborhoods.191 As black income stagnated, white wealth 
increased dramatically.192 Employment discrimination by the biggest 
local employers and by predominantly white unions further 
exacerbated the vast and growing racial disparities.193 
Denied the investment and resources that had been extended to 
white suburbanites, the economic infrastructure of black 
neighborhoods collapsed.194 Services “like trash collection, street 
lighting, and emergency response” were whittled away.195 In return, 
St. Louis devised urban renewal programs to eliminate black 
neighborhoods.196 The thinly disguised goal, incentivized by federal 
policy, was to push blacks out of the city.197 Effectively barred by 
exclusionary zoning ordinances in suburbs south of the city, by real 
estate practices that steered blacks away from white neighborhoods, 
and other forms of public and private discrimination, many blacks 
resettled in the northern and northwestern suburbs of St. Louis 
County, where Ferguson is located.198 
 But the move to Ferguson and other northern suburbs only 
created additional problems for the region’s new black residents. 
Understanding this point requires some appreciation of the 
metropolitan region’s highly fragmented jurisdictional system that 
stretched municipal resources.199 Originally designed in part to 
perpetuate racial segregation,200 the patchwork of separate 
jurisdictions meant that small towns and cities were forced to 
 
 191. See JACKSON, supra note 126, at 209–15 (describing federal and private 
investment in white suburbs and disinvestment in minority neighborhoods). 
 192. See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: 
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 124–29 (1998). 
 193. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 6, at 28. 
 194. See id. at 4–5 (suggesting that black neighborhoods were intentionally denied 
services, such as curbs, that were made available to other parts of the city). 
 195. Id. at 19. 
 196. Id.; see also SHARKEY, supra note 153, at 180 (noting the “razing of 
neighborhoods during urban renewal”). 
 197. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 6, at 14–19 (discussing federal programs designed to 
push blacks out of the city). 
 198. Id. at 18–19. 
 199. See Peter Coy, The County Map that Explains Ferguson’s Tragic Discord, 
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 15, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014-08-15/how-st-
dot-louis-countys-map-explains-fergusons-racial-discord [http://perma.cc/7R4W-A5JD]. 
 200. Id. (“Dating as far back as the 19th century, communities set themselves up as 
municipalities to capture control of tax revenue from local businesses, to avoid paying 
taxes to support poorer neighbors, or to exclude blacks.”). 
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compete for a limited pool of tax revenue, leaving fewer fiscal 
resources for services that were already reduced as a result of the 
relatively small tax base.201 
The influx of blacks spurred white flight202 from Ferguson and 
other northern suburbs.203 However, rapid racial turnover in the 
population, combined with voting schemes designed to dilute 
minority voting strength, extended Ferguson’s white power structure 
and its dominance over the majority-black population.204 To address 
persistently low sources of municipal revenue, white officials directed 
law enforcement to ticket and fine residents in black neighborhoods 
for minor municipal offenses.205 Blacks who could not pay were jailed 
at disproportionately high rates and charged compounded interest, 
leading to even higher fines over time.206 Law enforcement’s 
predatory behavior toward black residents sowed deep community 
distrust and resentment of the local police.207 
This is the point where the story of the officer’s fatal shooting of 
a black teenager on the Ferguson streets typically begins. But as we 
can see, this conventional account skips over nearly one-hundred 
years of racial history.208 And it pointedly leaves out historical 
context—such as the early racial zoning law and the concentration of 
racialized poverty in St. Louis that led to the notorious Pruitt-Igoe 
towers and, eventually, to efforts by St. Louis officials to expel blacks 
from the city. These historical moments allow us to unpack the 
racialized dynamics and tension that unfolded in Ferguson after the 
teenager’s death and to identify the discriminatory behavior and 
 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. 
 203. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 6, at 31 (“African Americans who were displaced 
then relocated to the few other places available, converting towns like Ferguson into new 
segregated enclaves.”); see also id. at 23; Hannah-Jones, supra note 9. 
 204. See Smith, supra note 9. 
 205. See DOJ REPORT, supra note 5, at 4–5; Radley Balko, How Municipalities in St. 
Louis County, Mo., Profit from Poverty, WASH. POST (Sept. 3, 2014), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2014/09/03/how-st-louis-county-missouri-profits-
from-poverty/ [https://perma.cc/UZJ7-2F5C] (describing municipal fines for having “uncut 
grass or unkempt property[,]” “wearing saggy pants[,]” or “not subscribing to the town’s 
only approved garbage collection service”). 
 206. See DOJ REPORT, supra note 5, at 54–56 (describing the system of unduly harsh 
penalties and steep interest payments in the Ferguson police system). 
 207. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 6, at 31. 
 208. This account also notably fails to mention the infamous St. Louis case of Dred 
Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), which declared that blacks had no rights 
that the “white man was bound to respect.” Id. at 407. 
94 N.C. L. REV. 1235 (2016) 
1272 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94 
attitudes that have been transmitted by public and private actors 
through time. 
This sprawling, unwieldy narrative—of different kinds of public 
and private discrimination across multiple geographies through the 
generations—offers a different, diagnostic approach to understanding 
the fatal encounter between the black teenager and white officer. It 
enables us to understand the complex forces that set the stage for this 
tragic moment and to be alert to the presence of adaptive techniques 
in other areas. The youth’s death triggered our search for deeper 
explanations about the multidimensional reasons for our racial 
inequality. However, we could use the same diagnostic approach to 
explain similar racial disparities throughout the country. 
In sum, we can seek to understand race the way we seek to 
understand human disease. Just as a doctor takes a person’s family 
history to determine the origins of a serious illness, we also need to 
look back in time to figure out how we arrived at this place of deep 
racial dysfunction and tragedy. Understanding this history helps us to 
understand the present. I return to these points in Part III, where I 
explore what the law might do to address adaptive discrimination and 
to help shine a light on our hidden racialized systems. 
II.  HOW CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FACILITATES ADAPTIVE 
DISCRIMINATION 
In her path-breaking book, The New Jim Crow, Michelle 
Alexander tells the story of Jarvious Cotton, an African-American 
parolee unable to vote due to the felon disenfranchisement law in his 
state: 
Jarvious Cotton cannot vote	.	.	.	.	Cotton’s great-great-
grandfather could not vote as a slave. His great-grandfather was 
beaten to death by the Ku Klux Klan for attempting to 
vote	.	.	.	.	His father was barred from voting by poll taxes and 
literacy tests. Today, Jarvious Cotton cannot vote because he, 
like many Black men in the United States, has been labeled a 
felon and is currently on parole.209 
This short narrative illustrates each of the components of adaptive 
discrimination outlined in the previous Part’s sections. It involves 
discrimination in voting and law enforcement, insofar as blacks 
comprise a disproportionate number of those imprisoned and, thus, a 
 
 209. ALEXANDER, supra note 13, at 1. 
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disproportionate number of those affected by felon 
disfranchisement.210 It also shows the dynamism of racial 
discrimination through the multiple iterations of race-explicit and 
formally race-neutral voting schemes that have denied black voting 
rights since slavery, resulting in racial subordination across the 
generations. 
Finally, Alexander’s example illustrates the regenerative aspects 
of discrimination: the inability to vote diminishes the political 
leverage of minority populations to change racially discriminatory 
government policies.211 Segregated schools and housing, the predatory 
behaviors of law enforcement commanded to contain blacks in their 
isolated spaces, and the host of social ills that flowed across 
generations from these tragic systems (from his grandfather, to his 
father, to Cotton himself) are all the products of adaptive 
discrimination’s invisible operation. Discrimination in these contexts 
generates other pernicious consequences downstream, as blacks are 
shut out of centers of social and economic opportunity in ways that 
disempower whole communities and neighborhoods. Once its full 
dimensions are unpacked, Cotton’s story demonstrates why we can 
never hope to arrest more than a tiny amount of racial inequality 
through constitutional law in its current form, which focuses primarily 
on intent. 
Conventional legal and social theories of racial discrimination 
reject the premise of adaptive discrimination that past discrimination 
is connected to present systemic racial disadvantage.212 This Part 
focuses on the deficiencies in constitutional doctrine, but similar 
 
 210. See, e.g., Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 232 (1985). 
 211. For example, a recent U.S. Department of Justice report indicated that the City of 
Ferguson, Missouri aggressively tickets African Americans and uses the resulting revenue 
from fines to fund the city’s municipal budget. See DOJ REPORT, supra note 5, at 4–5. 
Because Missouri law limits the ability of persons convicted of a felony to vote, see 
Howard v. United States, No. 4:06CV563 CDP, 2009 WL 1211164, at *7 (E.D. Mo. May 1, 
2009) (describing a Missouri law that restores voting rights to former felons only after they 
have completed incarceration and supervision), Jarvious Cotton could not vote to change 
this policy if he lived in Ferguson. See Marie Ceselski, Voter Registration for Felons and 18 
Year Olds, GREAT ST. OF ST. LOUIS (Jan. 3, 2015), http://thegreatstateofstlouis.wordpress
.com/category/voter-registration/ [https://perma.cc/BM6X-5NCL] (indicating that felons 
may not vote until they have completed their “sentence, probation, or parole”). An 
estimated “18,000 ex-offenders” live in the St. Louis area. See Steve Giegerich, New 
Hiring Guidelines Help Ex-offenders Gain Foothold in Job Market, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH (Apr. 29, 2012), http://www.stltoday.com/business/local/new-hiring-guidelines-
help-ex-offenders-gain-foothold-in-job/article_706f0388-9094-11e1-bbf9-0019bb30f31a
.html [https://perma.cc/VM76-VMXZ]. 
 212. See Freeman, supra note 88, at 1056 (defining “causation principle”). 
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deficiencies exist in the siloed organization of civil rights claims, with 
separate statutes for voting,213 housing,214 employment,215 public 
accommodations,216 and criminal justice,217 among others.218 This 
fragmentation in antidiscrimination law obscures the interaction and 
cross-fertilization of racial discrimination across different social, 
organizational, and institutional contexts.219 Constitutional doctrine 
suffers from similar limitations. We are not encouraged to see the 
ways in which Jarvious Cotton’s voting problems relate to the mass 
incarceration of people of color. Nor do we even think about the ways 
in which the shooting of the teenager in Ferguson relates to housing 
segregation or to transportation policies in the wider St. Louis area.220 
By cabining discrimination, we overlook the dynamic relationships 
and connections between and among its different forms. We miss the 
full dimensions of racial subordination and the broader picture of 
racial discrimination as a whole, living, evolving organism. 
Section II.A discusses the linear aspects of equal protection 
doctrine. Section II.B describes early cases that acknowledged 
adaptive forms of discrimination. Section II.C explores how 
constitutional law has short-circuited judicial and legislative remedies 
for discrimination by tying time to determinations about racial 
motive. I then apply these insights to the Civil Rights Cases, school 
desegregation, and the Court’s more recent decision in Shelby County 
v. Holder, which struck down a seminal provision of the Voting 
Rights Act. 
 
 213. See Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §	1971 (2012). 
 214. See Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §	3601 (2012) (declaring the provision of 
fair housing to be among the public policy goals of the United States). 
 215. See Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. §	2000e (2012). 
 216. See id. §	2000a. 
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of his civil rights under federal constitutional or statutory law). 
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are some similarities between constitutional law and statutory civil rights laws, they also 
diverge in important ways. See Rich, supra note 14, at 238 (discussing the “divergence and 
convergence” of constitutional doctrine and statutory law). Constitutional litigation that 
cuts across subject areas has more promise, but it has been rebuffed in the federal courts. 
See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 101 (1995). 
 219. Cf., e.g., Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging 
Ground of Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278, 1281–82 (2011) 
(discussing the Supreme Court’s differential, context-dependent application of equal 
protection principles). 
 220. But see ROTHSTEIN, supra note 6, at 4–7, 15–16 (discussing how successive public 
policies segregated Ferguson and created a racially divisive atmosphere). 
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A. The Linearity of Equal Protection 
1.  Neutralizing Racial Intent 
Equal protection assumes that racial discrimination is linear, 
involving the denial of a particular benefit or the placement of a 
particular burden on an identifiable person or group of persons 
because of their race. This transactional narrative is discrete and time-
centered; its harms are presumably confined only to the litigants 
themselves. Within this paradigm, the role of constitutional law is 
simply to neutralize intentionally discriminatory conduct.221 Cases like 
Washington v. Davis222—which held that disproportionate, adverse 
racial effects alone are not cognizable under equal protection223—
along with Personnel Administrator v. Feeney224 and McCleskey v. 
Kemp225—which heightened the standard for showing discriminatory 
intent—created this framework.226 
Legal scholars have long critiqued the intent paradigm as too 
narrow and formalistic.227 Alan Freeman argued decades ago that 
equal protection ratifies systemic racial discrimination by ignoring the 
conditions that perpetuate vast racial disadvantage.228 To sustain a 
claim, plaintiffs must begin by identifying the bad actor responsible 
for harmful outcomes that are traceable to specific prior 
discrimination.229 Furthermore, actionable discrimination must 
 
 221. Freeman, supra note 88, at 1053. An abundance of legal scholarship has explored 
the counter-majoritarian and institutional competence concerns that underlie the intent 
doctrine. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 42, at 1; Brest, Legislative Motive, supra note 42, at 95; 
Foster, supra note 30, at 1121–22 (discussing various theories of the intent doctrine and 
offering a more nuanced account); Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal 
Protection, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1134–42 (1989). 
 222. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
 223. Id. at 258. 
 224. 442 U.S. 256 (1979). 
 225. 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
 226. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 298 (defining “intent” as referring to conduct taken “because 
of” and not merely “in spite of” a protected characteristic). See generally McCleskey, 481 
U.S. 279 (requiring specific intent). 
 227. See, e.g., Ian F. Haney-López, Institutional Racism: Judicial Conduct and a New 
Theory of Racial Discrimination, 109 YALE L.J. 1717, 1825–26 (2000) (noting significant 
examples of institutional racism in grand jury proceedings and jury selection and 
proposing an institutional approach to the study of race); John A. Powell, Structural 
Racism: Building upon the Insights of John Calmore, 86 N.C. L. REV. 791, 795–97 (2008). 
 228. See Freeman, supra note 88, at 1053. 
 229. Id. (discussing the “perpetrator perspective”). Indeed, a plaintiff likely would not 
be able to satisfy standing prerequisites if she alleged systemic causes for a racially 
disparate outcome. See generally Boddie, supra note 88 (discussing problems associated 
with systemic theories in standing doctrine). 
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manifest within a geographic230 and subject matter context deemed 
“relevant” by the courts.231 
Discrimination should also be discernible within a prescribed 
period of time, as the Court has rejected remedies for harms that are 
“ageless in their reach into the past.”232 These time-based limitations, 
which I explore further below, are also a function of linear 
conceptions of racial discrimination. Although we can link current 
racial disparities to segregation from decades ago and to slavery over 
a century earlier,233 the Court does not recognize these harms as a 
constitutional justification for judicial remedy or even as the basis for 
voluntary affirmative action.234 In each of these respects, the intent 
doctrine is inconsistent with a multidimensional, systemic way of 
thinking.235 Although “the world is dynamic, evolving, and 
interconnected,” this doctrine principally depends on “mental models 
that are static, narrow, and reductionist.”236 
2.  The Rejection of Systemic Theories 
Constitutional doctrine has long been hostile to systemic theories 
of racial discrimination. Consider Milliken v. Bradley,237 which 
concerned the constitutionality of a district court order that sought to 
remedy de jure segregation in Detroit public schools with a 
metropolitan desegregation plan that included the city’s neighboring 
white suburbs.238 The Court held that schools could not be integrated 
across the city-suburb divide, unless the constitutional violation itself 
also crossed municipal boundaries.239 Although proven intentional 
 
 230. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 485 (1989) (rejecting 
evidence of racial disparities in the construction industry generally as being outside the 
“relevant market[,]” which therefore failed to justify a minority contracting program). 
 231. See, e.g., id. at 505 (rejecting evidence of school segregation to justify racial 
considerations in minority contracting program). 
 232. See, e.g., In re African-Am. Slave Descendants Litig., 304 F. Supp. 2d 1027, 1075 
(N.D. Ill. 2004) (dismissing a claim for reparations by African-American descendants of 
slaves on grounds that plaintiffs lacked standing and were time barred and that the claim 
was a nonjusticiable political question). 
 233. See generally FEAGIN, supra note 1 (discussing how the United States was shaped 
by extensive slavery and legal segregation). 
 234. See infra Section II.C. 
 235. As Sheila Foster has argued, however, intent can be demonstrated in multiple 
ways, and, in some cases, equal protection allows an inference of intent based on a 
showing of adverse racial impact. See Foster, supra note 30, at 1121–40. 
 236. See Sterman, System Dynamics Modeling, supra note 10, at 11. 
 237. 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
 238. Id. at 717–18. 
 239. See id. at 761–62. 
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discrimination by the Detroit school board—and a state law that 
exacerbated racial segregation240—helped to instigate white flight,241 
the Court refused to attribute these racial practices to a constitutional 
wrong.242 In so doing, the Court insulated a cross-jurisdictional system 
that effectuated racial segregation. As the theory of adaptive 
discrimination would predict, the ramifications of the Court’s decision 
reverberate even today in the Detroit area, where wrenching racial 
inequality has intensified.243 
Similarly in Missouri v. Jenkins,244 the Court concluded that a 
federal court order designed to facilitate interdistrict desegregation 
exceeded the court’s remedial authority to remedy an intradistrict 
violation.245 The Court’s power was limited to “restoring victims of 
discriminatory conduct to the position they would have occupied in 
the absence of such conduct.”246 Reflecting longstanding assumptions 
that discrimination is transactional and discrete, rather than dynamic 
and multifaceted, the Court considered it dispositive that the 
plaintiffs had failed to prove a “causal” relationship between 
intentional segregation by the Kansas City school district and 
segregation in the surrounding area.247 The Court’s decision not only 
stymied metropolitan desegregation efforts in the wake of white 
flight, but, along with Milliken, elevated the jurisdictional boundary 
as another constitutional barrier to systemic redress. 
3.  The Myth of the “Private” and the “Public” as Distinctive Spheres 
As discussed earlier, public and private practices have created 
and perpetuated racial discrimination across and within multiple 
spheres. For example, federal, state, and local laws all facilitated and 
 
 240. See id. at 726–27 (discussing the district court’s finding that the state committed 
constitutional violations by failing to provide students in Detroit the same “full range of 
state-supported transportation” as was provided to “many neighboring, mostly white [] 
suburban districts” and by acting to “impede, delay, and minimize racial integration in 
Detroit schools” (citing Bradley v. Milliken, 338 F. Supp. 582, 589 (E.D. Mich. 1971))). 
 241. See id. at 724–26. 
 242. As Professor David Troutt writes, this decoupling of private and public action was 
contrary to conventional local thinking about racial segregation across the city-suburb 
divide. See PRICE OF PARADISE, supra note 91, at 109. For some Detroit residents who 
participated in a focus group, “the relationship between Detroit’s tradition of segregated 
schools and white flight to its suburbs was as close as cause and effect.” Id. 
 243. See id. at 110–11. 
 244. 515 U.S. 70 (1995). 
 245. Id. at 92. 
 246. Id. at 88 (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 746 (1974)). 
 247. Id. at 95–96. 
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encouraged white flight from central cities to the suburbs,248 creating 
conditions that private landlords in the central cities then exploited in 
ways that exacerbated housing discrimination.249 When black students 
began to enroll in public schools that were formerly segregated by 
law, many white students fled to private, all-white academies, 
intensifying the racial isolation of blacks in public education.250 These 
public-private connections are also evident in criminal justice, as law 
enforcement officials have ruthlessly punished perceived infractions 
of the white social order.251 
Equal protection doctrine forces lower courts and litigants to 
ignore this context.252 I discuss one aspect of this problem below in the 
area of school desegregation.253 In these cases, the Court has limited 
federal judicial authority to remedy persistent segregation based on 
time-centered presumptions that racial segregation is attributable to 
private, “natural” preferences,254 rather than being the consequence 
 
 248. See JACKSON, supra note 126, at 196–99. 
 249. See, e.g., SATTER, supra note 179, at 40 (exploring the role that the real estate 
industry played in perpetuating substandard housing for blacks in Chicago and 
exacerbating housing discrimination). 
 250. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984), abrogated by Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static 
Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014); see also Boddie, supra note 88, at 350. 
 251. See KENNEDY, supra note 74, at 88 (“During the age of segregation, authorities 
used the criminal law to impose a stigmatizing code of conduct upon Negroes, one that 
demanded exhibitions of servility and the open disavowal of any desire for equality.”); id. 
at 90 (“During the Jim Crow era, officials also used criminal law to reimpose involuntary 
servitude upon blacks.”); see also BLACKMON, supra note 69, at 7 (describing the 
economic system of forced labor that resulted in the kidnapping and reenslavement of 
thousands of blacks for the benefit and profit of national private industry); id. (“By 1900, 
the South’s judicial system had been wholly reconfigured to make one of its primary 
purposes the coercion of African Americans to comply with the social customs and labor 
demands of whites.”). 
 252. We might also treat this as a problem with the state action doctrine, which fails to 
acknowledge the synergies between private and public discrimination. 
 253. See infra Section II.C.2.a (discussing school desegregation cases); see also 
Freeman, supra note 88, at 1072 (“Racial discrimination is thus wrenched from its social 
fabric and becomes a mere question of private, individual taste.”). But see City of 
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 492 (1989) (plurality opinion) (discussing a 
theory of how government “passive[ly] participa[tes]” in private discrimination). 
 254. Some federal courts in an earlier era, however, acknowledged the relationship 
between private “preferences” and public policies that had actively promoted segregation. 
For example, one federal district judge attributed the segregative housing choices of vast 
numbers of white families to the Chicago Housing Authority’s intentionally discriminatory 
housing practices. Gautreaux v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 296 F. Supp. 907, 915 (N.D. Ill. 1969), 
aff’d, 436 F.2d 306 (7th Cir. 1970). The district court concluded that the decision by 
“188,000 White families eligible for public housing	.	.	.	to forego their opportunity to 
obtain low cost housing rather than to move into all Negro projects in all Negro 
neighborhoods” was the “predictable result” of the housing authority’s “segregationist 
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of past government actions, which have fostered and enabled private 
discriminatory behavior.255 
4.  Colorblindness and “Societal Discrimination” 
Colorblindness principles in equal protection further corrupt our 
understanding of racial discrimination and blind the courts to its 
many permutations. For example, in Regents of the University of 
California v. Bakke,256 the Supreme Court struck down a university’s 
affirmative action policy that was designed to open opportunities to 
people of color in higher education as a response to widespread racial 
disparities and general historical discrimination.257 For the Court, 
however, the university’s goal of remedying “societal discrimination” 
was too “amorphous,” “ageless in its reach into the past,” and 
unconnected to “specific[,]” identified racial wrongdoing.258 Only 
particularized discrimination could justify race-specific affirmative 
action policies.259 Moreover, any such use of race triggered the most 
rigorous judicial review.260 For some time, this standard nearly always 
resulted in the invalidation of the challenged policy.261 
 
policy.” Id. The court similarly interpreted demographic “trends” that concentrated blacks 
in the central city and that led to white flight into the surrounding suburbs. Id.; see also 
Gautreaux v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 503 F.2d 930, 937–38 (7th Cir. 1974) (discussing the 
necessity of a metropolitan-wide remedy involving siting of public housing in the 
surrounding suburbs), aff’d sub nom. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976). Rather than 
explaining these residential patterns as the “natural” by-product of racially neutral 
preferences, as the Supreme Court would do in its later school desegregation decisions, 
the district court used them to demonstrate the importance of redoubling remedial efforts. 
See Gautreaux, 296 F. Supp. 2d at 915; infra Section II.C.2.a. It warned of a “desperately 
intensifying division of Whites and Negroes in Chicago” if these “existing patterns of 
residential separation” were not reversed. Gautreaux, 296 F. Supp. 2d at 915. 
 255. See Ford, supra note 19, at 1845 (“[R]acially identified space results from public 
policy and legal sanctions—in short, from state action—rather than being the unfortunate 
but irremediable consequence of purely private or individual choices.”); cf. Keyes v. Sch. 
Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 211 (1973) (“Intentional school segregation in the past may have 
been a factor in creating a natural environment for the growth of further segregation.”). 
 256. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
 257. Id. at 307; see also Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 
U.S. 701, 736, 748 (2007) (plurality opinion) (striking down the voluntary use of a race-
based student assignment plan to remedy de facto segregation). 
 258. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307 (opinion of Powell, J.). 
 259. Id. 
 260. Id. at 291. 
 261. Indeed, in Adarand v. Pena, Justice O’Connor sought to “dispel the notion that 
strict scrutiny is ‘strict in theory, but fatal in fact.’	” 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) (plurality 
opinion). 
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Similarly, in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,262 the Court 
rejected a minority contracting program on the grounds that its goal 
of improving opportunities for minorities rested on “generalized” 
assertions of past discrimination in the construction industry as a 
whole.263 The Court concluded that plaintiffs’ failure to define the 
“precise scope” of their injury doomed the remedy to having “no 
logical stopping point.”264 Observing that such an “ill-defined 
wrong”265 might be used to “justify race-based decision-making [that 
was] essentially limitless in scope and duration,” the Court struck 
down the program.266 The majority rebuffed arguments, propounded 
by Justice Marshall in dissent,267 that city officials sought to redress 
racial discrimination in enacting the local program.268 The Court 
determined that evidence of such racial disparities was immaterial 
because it was outside the “relevant,” locally defined market.269 
 
 262. 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (plurality opinion). 
 263. Id. at 498. 
 264. Id.; see also Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 310–11 (1986) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (expressing concerns about the duration of racial considerations). 
 265. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. at 498. 
 266. Id. 
 267. See id. at 544 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (observing “that the city's leadership is 
deeply familiar with	.	.	.	racial discrimination” and “[has] spent long years witnessing 
multifarious acts of discrimination [in voting, school desegregation, and housing]”). In 
seeking to justify the city’s affirmative action policy, Justice Marshall also advanced a 
more sophisticated understanding of the connections between private discrimination and 
the state: 
The majority is wrong to trivialize the continuing impact of government 
acceptance or use of private institutions or structures once wrought by 
discrimination. When government channels all its contracting funds to a white-
dominated community of established contractors whose racial homogeneity is the 
product of private discrimination, it does more than place its imprimatur on the 
practices which forged and which continue to define that community. It also 
provides a measurable boost to those economic entities that have thrived within it, 
while denying important economic benefits to those entities which, but for prior 
discrimination, might well be better qualified to receive valuable government 
contracts. 
Id. at 538. 
 268. Id. at 505 (majority opinion) (“The ‘evidence’ relied upon by the dissent, the 
history of school desegregation in Richmond and numerous congressional reports, does 
little to define the scope of any injury to minority contractors in Richmond or the 
necessary remedy. The factors relied upon by the dissent could justify a preference of any 
size or duration.”). 
 269. Id. at 485. In Adarand v. Pena, the Court extended the same rigorous standard of 
judicial review to the use of affirmative action in federal programs, imposing strict scrutiny 
on race-conscious efforts to increase the ranks of persons of color in the contracting 
industry. 515 U.S. 200, 222 (1995) (plurality opinion). Not until Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 
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In these cases and others,270 the Court has dismissed widespread 
racial disparities as a justification for race-conscious remedies because 
there is no causal connection to intentional discrimination.271 This 
“societal” discrimination is so pervasive that the Court has placed it 
beyond the reach of constitutional remedy, much like a metastatic 
cancer that cannot be treated because its origins are either unknown 
or unknowable. In sum, constitutional law has created a framework 
that deems affirmative action programs, used to promote racial 
inclusion, as doctrinally suspect. Yet it gives a free pass to adaptive 
discrimination that fosters and entrenches racial inequality. 
B. Early Civil Rights Cases that Acknowledged Adaptive Forms of 
Discrimination 
For a very limited time in the aftermath of Brown v. Board of 
Education, the Supreme Court curbed state and local government 
efforts to circumvent civil rights mandates. Lower federal courts also 
vigorously enforced judicial remedies against obvious governmental 
resistance.272 As discussed earlier, adaptive strategies used by 
government officials included the use of alternative discriminatory 
structures to condition access to education, such as all-white private 
schools and “freedom of choice” plans that perpetuated segregation 
by deferring to white preferences for white schools.273 
 
U.S. 306 (2003) (plurality opinion), did the Court uphold a race-conscious admissions 
policy that was designed to promote the educational benefits of diversity. Grutter, 539 U.S. 
at 343–44. And even then the Court was careful to distinguish this narrow justification 
from the broader “societal discrimination” rationale that had been rejected in Bakke. See 
id. at 323–24. 
 270. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 
731 (2007) (plurality opinion) (“The sweep of the mandate claimed by the district is 
contrary to our rulings that remedying past societal discrimination does not justify race-
conscious government action.”); Adarand, 515 U.S. at 222 (applying strict scrutiny to 
affirmative action in federal contracting); J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. at 498 (affirmative action 
in municipal contracting); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 (1986) 
(arguing that racial classifications must have an exact connection with their justifications). 
 271. See, e.g., In re African-Am. Slave Descendants Litig., 375 F. Supp. 2d 721, 780–81 
(N.D. Ill. 2005) (dismissing reparations claims on multiple grounds, including standing and 
the political question doctrine), aff’d in part as modified, rev’d in part, 471 F.3d 754 (7th 
Cir. 2006). 
 272. See infra text accompanying notes 353–55. 
 273. See supra Section I.A; cf. Boddie, supra note 88, at 349–52 (describing 
unsuccessful efforts to challenge federal tax exemptions to private, discriminatory white 
schools, which undermined public school desegregation). 
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The Supreme Court addressed some dimensions of this problem 
in Green v. County School Board.274 The Court struck down a 
“freedom of choice” plan adopted by a local school district in rural 
Virginia that had been segregated by law.275 The district consisted of 
just two schools, one that had been assigned to black students; the 
other that had been designated for white students.276 When the district 
was ordered to desegregate, the state of Virginia passed laws that, 
while omitting any express references to race, were obviously 
intended to achieve the same segregative result.277 One state law 
divested local school boards of the authority to assign children to 
schools, reserving that power to the state instead.278 Under the law, 
students were “automatically reassigned” to the school they had 
attended during the previous year.279 New students were assigned a 
school selected by the state.280 
Predictably, the previous racial patterns persisted. Over ten years 
after the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown, “not a single white 
child” had chosen to attend the black school, and eighty-five percent 
of the black children in the system still attended the all-black 
school.281 Against the context of longstanding state-mandated 
segregation, the Court declared the plan an unconstitutional effort to 
perpetuate the prior de jure system,282 despite its formal prohibition 
against the intentional exclusion of black children.283 It directed the 
school district to eliminate the vestiges of the prior state-enforced 
system “root and branch”284 and to devise a plan that “promise[d] 
realistically to work, and promise[d] realistically to work now.”285 
Although the Court did not use the precise language of adaptive 
discrimination, it plainly conceptualized the school desegregation 
problem in those terms. It observed that “time and flexibility” would 
be required to “dismantl[e]” “well-entrenched dual systems” given 
 
 274. 391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
 275. Id. at 441. 
 276. Id. at 432. 
 277. Id. at 432–33 (referring to statutes “enacted by Virginia in resistance” to Brown). 
 278. Id. at 433. 
 279. Id. 
 280. Id. 
 281. Id. at 441. 
 282. Id. at 438 (describing the “freedom of choice” plan as a “deliberate perpetuation 
of the unconstitutional dual system”). 
 283. Id. at 441. 
 284. Id. at 438. 
 285. Id. at 439. 
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the “complex and multifaceted problems [that] would arise.”286 
Accordingly, it placed the burden on the school district to establish 
that its proposed plan would provide “meaningful and immediate 
progress toward disestablishing state-imposed segregation.”287 It 
further determined that the district court “should retain jurisdiction 
until it is clear that state-imposed segregation has been completely 
removed.”288 
South Carolina v. Katzenbach289 provides another useful example 
of the Court’s prior willingness to check adaptive techniques, 
specifically in the context of minority voting.290 For one-hundred 
years after the Fifteenth Amendment was ratified, racial 
discrimination in voting remained deeply entrenched in the South.291 
Government officials routinely developed new strategies for 
circumventing federal court orders and legislative mandates that 
barred discrimination.292 All-white primaries excluded blacks and 
Latinos from electoral participation, as did poll taxes and literacy 
tests.293 When these were outlawed or struck down, public officials 
devised other discriminatory methods to replace them.294 These 
innovations did not deny access to the ballot outright, but they had 
the comparable effect of weakening minority voting power.295 At-
large voting schemes and the annexation of predominantly white 
areas to majority-black ones were commonly used to dilute the 
 
 286. See id. at 437. 
 287. Id. at 439. 
 288. Id. 
 289. 383 U.S. 301 (1966), abrogated by Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 
(2013) (holding the coverage formula in Section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act to be 
unconstitutionally outdated). 
 290. See id. at 308. 
 291. See Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2619–20 (2013); KEYSSAR, supra note 
103, at 216. These problems are in other parts of the country as well. See Shelby Cty., 133 
S. Ct. at 2620. 
 292. See MINORITY VOTE DILUTION, supra note 103, at 2. 
 293. Id. at 3. 
 294. See Pamela S. Karlan, John Hart Ely and the Problem of Gerrymandering: The 
Lion in Winter, 114 YALE L.J. 1329, 1330–31 (2005) (discussing minority vote dilution); 
Nina Perales, Luis Figueroa & Criselda G. Rivas, Voting Rights in Texas: 1982–2006, 17 S. 
CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 713, 713–14 (2008) (discussing strategies used to suppress the 
minority vote in Texas); see also MINORITY VOTE DILUTION, supra note 103, at 12 (noting 
that some discriminatory responses to increased minority voting succeeded despite the 
Voting Rights Act); Freeman, supra note 88, at 1082 (citing U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL 
RIGHTS, VOTING IN MISSISSIPPI 10 (1965) (noting that many efforts to increase black 
voter participation in the the 1960s South were ultimately unsuccessful)). 
 295. See Nina Perales, Reflections on the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, 2014 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 10 (2014). 
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minority vote.296 By adapting their techniques, these jurisdictions 
successfully evaded enforcement. 
Plaintiffs could always challenge these tactics in court, of course, 
but litigation was a slow, expensive, and often ineffective remedy, as 
the resulting discrimination irreparably skewed election outcomes.297 
As soon as federal courts barred one form of voting discrimination, 
another form of discrimination surfaced in its place. Plaintiffs could 
not sue—and the courts could not move—fast enough to keep up with 
the problem. 
Congress passed the 1965 Voting Rights Act in response. The 
Act contained mechanisms that targeted recidivist jurisdictions with 
records of repeated voting discrimination and required them to secure 
federal approval before they could adopt new voting requirements.298 
In Katzenbach, the Supreme Court squarely rejected a constitutional 
challenge to these provisions, taking explicit account of the adaptive 
aspects of voting discrimination that had precipitated the Act.299 In 
upholding these provisions under Congress’s constitutional authority 
to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment, the Court noted the 
“unremitting and ingenious defiance” of the covered jurisdictions, 
which stubbornly sought to defy constitutional and statutory bans on 
intentional racial discrimination.300 It concluded that such provisions 
were critical for curbing discrimination before it could mutate and 
take root in a different form. 
C. The Hidden Role of Time 
The previous Section explored decisions handed down by the 
Supreme Court at the height of its commitment to civil rights, when it 
was prepared to support a more robust role for the federal courts and 
Congress in policing adaptive forms of discrimination. In these early 
 
 296. See, e.g., MINORITY VOTE DILUTION, supra note 103, at 2. Other techniques that 
appeared race-neutral were in fact designed to frustrate minority voters. When the 
Supreme Court struck down the poll tax in 1966, Texas immediately legislated an annual 
voter registration requirement that made it harder to vote. See Robert W. Doty, The Texas 
Voter Registration Law and the Due Process Clause, 7 HOUS. L. REV. 163, 163 (1969). 
 297. See sources cited supra note 294. 
 298. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2635 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(observing that the Voting Rights Act sought to redress “second-generation barriers” to 
voting, such as racial gerrymandering, the discriminatory use of at-large voting, and the 
annexation of majority-white areas that were designed to dilute minority voting strength). 
 299. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966), abrogated by Shelby Cty. 
v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013). 
 300. Id. at 309. 
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cases the Court was far more willing than in later cases to infer a 
racially discriminatory motive.301 As discussed below, that readiness 
to attribute racially disparate outcomes to discriminatory intent later 
faded. What accounts for this shift? 
This Section attributes the Court’s recent decisions to an 
assumption that discrimination ceases to be constitutionally 
cognizable after a certain period of time—in other words, that it 
expires (rather than adapts), at which point it is beyond constitutional 
remedy. Here I explore the role that time plays in constitutional 
determinations about the legitimacy of legislative and judicial 
remedies. I contend that the Court’s misplaced focus on time has led 
it to disregard discrimination’s adaptive qualities. 
We can understand the origins of the problem by returning to the 
precepts of adaptive discrimination. Given basic human tendencies, 
judges interpret constitutional law using shortcuts to make sense of 
the complex systems and operations that create racial discrimination. 
These temporal constructs, however, limit their understanding. As a 
result, they are more likely to presume that time severs the “causal” 
relationship between prior intentional discrimination and current 
racial disparities. As a result, litigation outcomes in discrimination 
cases often depend on a hidden contest over the significance of time. 
This happens in two ways. First, litigants debate the relationship 
of past racial discrimination to current racial disparities.302 Second, in 
addition to the historical record, existing doctrine implicitly demands 
a focus on how much time has passed since the initial constitutional 
violation. The length of elapsed time is used to assess the 
decisionmaker’s underlying racial motivation and, therefore, the 
constitutional necessity of ongoing race-based remedies. This last use 
of time is particularly problematic. As a heuristic, it masks and 
confuses the way that racial discrimination operates. 
 
 301. See Brest, Legislative Motive, supra note 42, at 99–100 (discussing the apparent 
racial motivation in Griffin v. County School Board, 377 U.S. 218 (1964), and Gomillion v. 
Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960)). 
 302. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Shelby County and the Illusion of Minimalism, 22 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 713, 731 (2014) (noting the Shelby County majority’s 
“ahistoricism”); Joel Heller, Shelby County and the End of History, 44 U. MEM. L. REV. 
357, 362 (2013) (discussing “the importance of looking to past conditions to evaluate 
present circumstances”). 
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1.  The Civil Rights Cases 
Decided in 1883, the Civil Rights Cases offer one early example 
of the time problem in constitutional doctrine. The Court’s decision 
struck down congressional legislation passed in 1875 that prohibited 
private racial discrimination in public accommodations.303 The Court’s 
conclusion that Congress had exceeded its enforcement powers under 
the Thirteenth Amendment in passing the public accommodations 
law is most interesting for present purposes. The Thirteenth 
Amendment, which abolished slavery,304 unquestionably reaches 
private conduct.305 The Court concluded that Congress’s powers 
extended beyond state laws “establishing or upholding slavery”306 and 
embraced an affirmative mandate to “establish[] and decree[] 
universal civil and political freedom throughout the United States.”307 
It further determined that Congress’s authority to enforce these 
freedoms included the “right to enact all necessary and proper laws 
for the obliteration and prevention of slavery, with all its badges and 
incidents.”308 
This expansive reading of the Thirteenth Amendment would 
seem to suggest that congressional power reached private 
discrimination at least in places of public accommodation. But here 
the Court pivoted to a more formalistic understanding: the 
“incidents” of slavery had nothing to do with the denial of public 
accommodation on the basis of race.309 Access to privately owned 
places of public accommodation was not a “fundamental right” of 
 
 303. The Court concluded that the law exceeded Congress’s enforcement powers under 
the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. See id. at 27–28 (1883). Moreover, the Court 
determined that private discrimination was not “state” action and, therefore, lay beyond 
Congress’s powers to enforce laws against discrimination by governmental actors. Id. at 
21–23. 
 304. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; see also Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 27–28 (“[T]he 
Thirteenth Amendment, which abolishes slavery	.	.	.	declares ‘that neither slavery, nor 
involuntary servitude, except as punishment for crime, whereof the party shall have been 
duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their 
jurisdiction;’ and it gives Congress power to enforce the amendment by appropriate 
legislation.”). 
 305. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 30 (“Under the Thirteenth Amendment the 
legislation, so far as necessary or proper to eradicate all forms and incidents of slavery and 
involuntary servitude, may be direct and primary, operating upon the acts of individuals, 
whether sanctioned by State legislation or not.”). 
 306. Id. at 28. 
 307. Id. 
 308. Id. 
 309. See id. at 31. 
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citizenship, but a “social right”310 that lay beyond Congress’s 
enforcement jurisdiction.311 
Most importantly for our purposes, the Court’s conclusion 
betrayed its impatience with the asserted connection between the 
denial of public accommodation and slavery: 
When a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of 
beneficent legislation has shaken off the inseparable 
concomitants of that state, there must be some stage in the 
progress of his elevation when he takes the rank of mere 
citizen, and ceases to be the special favorite of the laws, and 
when his rights as a citizen, or a man, are to be protected in the 
ordinary modes by which other men’s rights are protected.312 
It is worth pausing here to observe the boldness of the Court’s 
assertion, not even two decades after the formal end313 of the Civil 
War and the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment, that “at some 
stage” blacks would have to cease being the “special favorite of the 
law.” The notion that blacks somehow enjoyed favored status—and 
that such status, having been conferred, had already run out—is 
astonishing in its own right. But the Court’s flat, one-dimensional 
characterization of slavery and its “inseparable concomitants” is also 
fully consistent with what we know about constitutional law over a 
century later: it propounds the view that the effects of discrimination 
necessarily diminish as time wears on. Because discrimination 
recedes, so too should any remedies designed to redress it. Only such 
a notion could explain the Court’s blindness to the intergenerational 
damage that slavery had wrought and its highly strained 
interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment guarantee. 
2.  How Time Influences Determinations of Racial Motive 
The next two Sections turn to school desegregation cases and to 
Shelby County. Many scholars have attributed the outcomes in the 
school cases to concerns about the institutional competence of the 
federal judiciary to manage longstanding desegregation efforts and to 
 
 310. Id. at 30. 
 311. Id. 
 312. Id. at 31. 
 313. See Gregory P. Downs, Opinion, The Dangerous Myth of Appomattox, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 11, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/12/opinion/sunday/the-dangerous-
myth-of-appomattox.html [https://perma.cc/M98Z-8V4W] (explaining that the Civil War 
continued beyond the formal ceasefire). 
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the virtues of local control.314 Similarly, Shelby County can be framed 
as a decision about federalism and the Court’s conservative 
commitment to protecting state sovereignty.315 These Sections do not 
discount any of these explanations. Rather, they offer another 
framework for understanding these cases and expose the assumptions 
about time that linger beneath their surface. Understanding the 
hidden role of time can also explain how measures that were designed 
to unwind generations of discrimination become constitutionally 
suspect.316 My point is that the legitimacy of such measures is highly 
sensitive to the passage of time: the more time that has passed, the 
less justifiable they are in the eyes of the Court. 
Here we can connect time to another problem that occupies 
constitutional law: assessing the role that racial motive plays in 
government action.317 In an early article, Paul Brest explained how 
the passage of time bears on judicial determinations of illicit 
motive.318 As Brest conceived the problem, the chronology and 
sequence of underlying events are important factors.319 This is 
because intentional discrimination follows a conventional path: “the 
decisionmaker enforces a discriminatory operative rule; a court 
enjoins this practice; the decisionmaker then adopts a constitutionally 
 
 314. See Wendy Parker, The Supreme Court and Public Law Remedies: A Tale of Two 
Kansas Cities, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 475, 480 (1999) (describing the “increased importance in 
returning school districts to ‘local control’	” in school desegregation cases). 
 315. Cf. James Blacksher & Lani Guinier, Free at Last: Rejecting Equal Sovereignty 
and Restoring the Constitutional Right to Vote, Shelby County v. Holder, 8 HARV. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 39, 43 (2014) (“[Shelby County] is not based on a violation of any specific 
provision of the Constitution at all. Instead, the majority holds that Section 4 of the Voting 
Rights Act is unconstitutional because	.	.	.	it violates not a Constitutional imperative but a 
mere ‘tradition’: ‘our historic tradition that all the States enjoy equal sovereignty.’	” 
(quoting Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2621, 2621 (2013))); Hasen, supra note 302, at 
744–45 (describing the Court’s majority opinion in Shelby County as the product of “Chief 
Justice Roberts’s longer-term project to bring constitutional jurisprudence in line with his 
conservative political vision while seeking to project the aura of modest technocratic 
justices simply doing their jobs”). 
 316. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 803 
(2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 317. See Louis S. Raveson, Unmasking the Motives of Government Decisionmakers: A 
Subpoena for Your Thoughts?, 63 N.C. L. REV. 879, 880 (1985) (“[The Court has 
embraced enthusiastically reviewing the purpose for which an official act was taken as a 
critical factor in determining the action’s constitutionality.”). 
 318. See Brest, Legislative Motive, supra note 42, at 122. 
 319. See id. (“The juxtaposition of a decision with some prior event or sequence of 
events often bears on the inference of illicit motivation.”); see also Vill. of Arlington 
Heights v. Met. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267 (1977) (identifying a circumstantial 
“sequence of events” factor within the broader inquiry into discriminatory intent). 
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‘innocent’ rule that effectively maintains the status quo.”320 A 
decisionmaker’s “past behavior[,]” Brest wrote, “usually justifies the 
court’s strong suspicion of his motives.”321 
This account captures the dynamics of the cases described above, 
in which intransigent governmental officials in the aftermath of 
Brown resisted integration mandates under the auspices of formally 
race-neutral practices.322 Time is central to the Court’s judgment of 
racial motivation—it explains why in Green323 and Katzenbach324 the 
Court was willing to acknowledge and curb adaptive practices, but 
retreated in subsequent decades. 
And yet, the presumption that time inoculates us against racial 
discrimination is inconsistent with history and experience. The fault 
rests again with the linear conceptions of racial discrimination that 
underlie Brest’s model. This model focuses on governmental officials 
with a record of past discriminatory behavior who then promote race-
neutral policies with racially harmful outcomes. Under Brest’s 
formulation, this official conduct is presumptively suspicious because 
of the chronology and sequence of their actions.325 This is a 
reasonable assumption, but it also implies that racial discrimination 
subsides as new decisionmakers come on board and the more devout 
racists leave the scene.326 In other words, it ignores the lessons of 
history—that racial discrimination has been “handed down” through 
 
 320. Brest, Legislative Motive, supra note 42, at 122. 
 321. Id. at 127. 
 322. Id. at 123 (“The sequence of events may thus support the inference that the 
decisionmaker’s objective was to do covertly that which he was forbidden to do overtly.”). 
 323. The Green Court also referenced time in its decision, but placed time on the side 
of the plaintiffs in its determination that the school board’s “freedom of choice” plan was 
unconstitutional. Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438 (1968) (“In determining 
whether respondent School Board met [the command to disestablish its prior dual system] 
by adopting its ‘freedom-of-choice’ plan, it is relevant that this first step did not come until 
some 11 years after Brown I was decided and 10 years after Brown II directed the making 
of a ‘prompt and reasonable start.’	”). 
 324. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 328 (1966) (“After enduring 
nearly a century of systematic resistance to the Fifteenth Amendment, Congress might 
well decide to shift the advantage of time and inertia from the perpetrators of the evil to 
its victims.”), abrogated by Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
 325. Brest, Legislative Motive, supra note 42, at 126 (discussing the problem of 
disguised illicit motivation by a repeat offender). 
 326. Cf. id. (“Sometimes a material change of circumstances, or the passage of time 
accompanied by a change of community attitudes, will be persuasive of the 
decisionmaker’s good faith.”). 
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the generations.327 If experience is our guide, we have far less of a 
basis to presume good faith in matters of race. 
We can see the influence of Brest’s theory in equal protection 
doctrine. For example, in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan 
Housing Development Corp.328 the Court considered whether a village 
acted unconstitutionally in refusing to rezone a parcel of land to 
accommodate racially integrated, low-income housing.329 The Court 
rejected the equal protection claim, concluding that there was nothing 
in the “specific sequence of events” that led up to the challenged 
decision or “departures from the normal procedural sequence” that 
gave rise to the inference of an improper motive.330 Nor was there 
anything suspicious in the “contemporaneous statements by members 
of the decisionmaking body.”331 Therefore, the Court perceived no 
need for further constitutional inquiry. 
Still, the refusal to rezone bore all the hallmarks of adaptive 
discrimination. The town’s decision bore more heavily on racial 
minorities.332 And, perhaps most critically, racial segregation was 
particularly acute in the village relative to the surrounding area.333 Of 
its 64,000 residents, only 27 were black.334 There was good reason to 
 
 327. See FEAGIN, supra note 1, at 36 (“For systemic racism to persist across so many 
generations, white individuals and small groups have had to participate actively in the 
ongoing collective and discriminatory reproduction of the family, community, legal, 
political, economic, educational, and religious institutions that undergird this inegalitarian 
system.”). 
 328. 429 U.S. 252 (1977). 
 329. Id. at 254–55. 
 330. Id. at 267. 
 331. Id. at 268. 
 332. Id. at 269. 
 333. As the Arlington Heights respondents noted in their brief to the Court: 
[T]he massive growth in population in Arlington Heights in the past two decades 
has, with rare exceptions, been limited to whites. Of Arlington Heights’ 1970 
population of 64,884, 27, or less than 0.1 percent, were black. Arlington Heights is 
the most residentially segregated community and has the most racially 
exclusionary housing stock in the Chicago metropolitan area among the 
municipalities with more than 50,000 residents. 
Brief for the Respondents, Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 
(1977) (No. 75-616), 1976 WL 181306, at *12 (internal citations omitted). The respondents 
further noted that this pattern contrasted sharply with the racial demographics of the 
Chicago metropolitan area. See id. at *13 (“The number and percentage of blacks [in the 
area] rose substantially during the 1960s. While their numbers grew, however, almost all 
minority persons in the Chicago area were still confined to segregated Chicago 
neighborhoods in 1970.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 334. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 255. Some local constituents appeared to object to 
the development on racial grounds. Id. at 269. 
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be suspicious that the town’s zoning decision itself was racially 
motivated, but the time data in the Court’s estimation did not support 
the inference.335 
Thus, in Arlington Heights, time implicitly drives the 
constitutional analysis. The Court more readily detects covert racial 
motive if it manifests close in time to prior overt discrimination. In 
the absence of such evidence, however, the Court is more likely to 
presume good faith, weakening the constitutional basis for legislative 
and judicial remedies and even for voluntary affirmative action.336 As 
a result, adaptive discrimination goes unchecked. 
The cases discussed below illustrate different dimensions of the 
same problem. Because of the passage of time, the Court is unwilling 
to presume illicit racial motivation. In the school desegregation 
context, the time problem has led the Court to adopt standards that 
make it easier to terminate federal jurisdiction over long-running 
cases. In Shelby County, the Court invoked time to invalidate a core 
provision of the Voting Rights Act that curbed adaptive forms of 
voting discrimination. Once again, the Court relied on linear 
conceptions of racial discrimination by placing racial intent at the 
center of the constitutional analysis and then advancing time concerns 
to avoid finding intent. Both of these constitutional choices obscure 
the presence of adaptive discrimination. 
a. School Desegregation 
A key constitutional question in school desegregation cases has 
been the scope of a federal district court’s equitable authority to 
retain jurisdiction in cases brought to eliminate the vestiges of state-
enforced segregation in public schools.337 I contend that the standard 
set by the Court to govern the scope of federal judicial oversight has 
been influenced by its sense of time. Specifically, it uses time to 
absolve formerly de jure segregated districts of responsibility for 
ongoing racial disparities, attributing them to private “preferences,” 
 
 335. See Metro. Dev. Hous. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1294 
(7th Cir. 1977) (concluding that the Village’s refusal to rezone, assuming a proper showing 
of discriminatory effect, violated the Fair Housing Act under a disparate impact analysis). 
 336. See Brest, Legislative Motive, supra note 42, at 123 (“The strength of the inference 
will also be affected by the tenacity of the decisionmaker’s past commitment to the 
forbidden rule, the extent to which the innovation marks a departure from traditionally 
established practices, and the existence of other decisions that seem designed to serve the 
same illicit objective.”). 
 337. See Parker, supra note 314, at 524–28 (discussing the importance of equitable 
discretion in school desegregation cases). 
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rather than to the school’s prior intentional segregation. The Court 
achieves this by declaring that the passage of time has severed the 
causal relationship between past racial intent and current racial 
inequality. 
Board of Education v. Dowell338 illustrates the point. It is worth 
some effort to unpack the case’s chronology to show that, as in the 
Civil Rights Cases, the Court exaggerates time in its rush to terminate 
judicial supervision. In 1961, black students and their parents sued the 
Oklahoma City school board to end de jure segregation in the public 
schools.339 The district court concluded that the city “had intentionally 
segregated both schools and housing” and that the board, by design, 
continued to operate a segregated school system.340 When the district 
court ordered the school district to desegregate, the board shifted to a 
“neighborhood zoning” plan.341 Because of persistent residential 
segregation, the plan failed to promote integration.342 Therefore, the 
district court in 1972 ordered the school district to adopt more 
aggressive measures, including busing for both black and white 
students.343 
Five years later, in 1977, the school board successfully moved to 
terminate the case.344 As the district’s racial composition changed due 
to white flight,345 the school board returned to its old neighborhood 
student assignment plan,346 which further entrenched school 
segregation.347 In 1984, plaintiffs moved to reopen litigation.348 The 
district court denied plaintiffs’ motion and vacated the desegregation 
decree.349 Critically for our purposes, the court concluded that 
 
 338. 498 U.S. 237 (1991). 
 339. Id. at 240. 
 340. Id. 
 341. Id. 
 342. Id. (“In 1965, the District Court found that the School Board’s attempt to 
desegregate by using neighborhood zoning failed to remedy past segregation because 
residential segregation resulted in one-race schools.”). 
 343. Id. at 241. 
 344. Id. 
 345. Id. at 242 (noting that young black students were being bused increasingly longer 
distances due to shifting demographics, meaning that whites were moving to the outer 
reaches of the city). 
 346. Id. 
 347. Id. (“Under the [neighborhood zoning plan], 11 of 64 elementary schools would 
be greater than 90% Black, 22 would be greater than 90% White plus other minorities, 
and 31 would be racially mixed.”). 
 348. Id. at 243 (noting that while the district court had “terminated” the case, it had not 
dissolved the injunctive decree it had entered in 1972). 
 349. Id. 
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“present residential segregation”—which under the school board’s 
neighborhood assignment plan ensured a greater percentage of 
racially segregated schools—was not a product of prior de jure 
segregation.350 Rather, it was the result of “private decisionmaking 
and economics” and, therefore, “was too attenuated” to be traceable 
to the school board’s previous, unconstitutional acts.351 The lower 
court further determined that the board’s neighborhood assignment 
plan had “not been designed with discriminatory intent,” a conclusion 
that would prove central to the question of whether the district court 
could continue to exercise its equitable jurisdiction over the case.352 
The question before the Supreme Court was highly technical, but 
important. It concerned whether the district court had applied too 
lenient a standard for dissolving the desegregation decree.353 On 
review of the district court’s decision, the court of appeals enunciated 
a standard that was far more stringent. “[A] desegregation decree 
remains in effect,” the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded, 
“until a school district can show ‘grievous wrong evoked by new and 
unforeseen conditions,’	”354 and “dramatic changes in conditions 
unforeseen at the time of the decree that	.	.	.	impose extreme and 
unexpectedly oppressive hardships on the obligor.”355 
The more rigorous standard was central to the disposition of the 
case. By requiring the district court to continue its supervision of the 
school district’s desegregation efforts, the higher standard would have 
meant more integrative measures for Oklahoma City’s public schools. 
The court of appeals determined that the board’s neighborhood 
assignment plan would lead to resegregation and that “circumstances 
in Oklahoma City had not changed enough to justify modification of 
the decree.”356 
Although the court of appeals did not use the terminology of 
adaptive discrimination, its decision to hold the lower court to a more 
demanding standard acknowledged the problem. By requiring a 
heightened showing of school board compliance and “dramatic 
changes in conditions unforeseen at the time of the decree,” the court 
 
 350. Id. 
 351. Id. 
 352. Id. 
 353. See id. at 243–44. 
 354. Id. at 244 (quoting United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 119 (1932)). 
 355. Id. (quoting Dowell ex rel. Dowell v. Bd. of Educ., 890 F.2d 1483, 1490 (10th Cir. 
1989)). 
 356. Id. 
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of appeals acknowledged the systemic, dynamic, and regenerative 
nature of racial discrimination. In the appellate court’s view, a more 
exacting approach—and one that would undoubtedly lengthen the 
district court’s continued involvement in the case—was necessary for 
excavating longstanding patterns of racial separation.357 In other 
words, segregation required remedial efforts that were worthy of its 
metastatic qualities.358 
The Supreme Court reversed, rejecting the more demanding 
standard. Instead, it concluded that a district court could 
constitutionally release a local school board from continuing 
oversight upon a showing that the board “had complied in good faith 
with the desegregation decree since it was entered, and that the 
vestiges of past discrimination had been eliminated to the extent 
practicable.”359 The Court emphasized that “federal supervision of 
local school systems was intended as a temporary measure to remedy 
past discrimination.”360 Once local authorities have complied with a 
desegregation decree “for a reasonable period of time,” then it is 
appropriate for the local school board to resume control of its 
operations.361 The Court further observed that the “test espoused by 
the Court of Appeals would condemn a school district, once governed 
by a board which intentionally discriminated, to judicial tutelage for 
the indefinite future.”362 
The Dowell formulation made time a key factor for assessing the 
district court’s equitable discretion to modify desegregation 
decrees.363 It rested on the assumption that the passage of time cures 
the constitutional violation and that any remaining segregation must 
be due to private preferences or to racially “neutral” demographic 
 
 357. Id. 
 358. See generally Parker, supra note 314, at 479–80 (calling for judges to exercise more 
robust remedial discretion in school desegregation cases). 
 359. Dowell, 498 U.S. at 249–50. However, the burden is on the school district to make 
this showing. Id. 
 360. Id. at 247 (emphasis added). 
 361. Id. at 248. 
 362. Id. at 249. The Court has cautioned against indiscriminate reliance on history 
alone as the justification for remedial measures that have “no logical stopping point” in 
the context of voluntary integration, see Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. 
Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 760 (2007), and in the context of affirmative action in 
contracting, City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 499 (1989). 
 363. See Gautreaux v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 981 F. Supp. 1091, 1093–94 (N.D. Ill. 1997) 
(“[A]s the school desegregation cases instruct us, federal court supervision of local 
government operations should be a ‘temporary measure to remedy past discrimination’ 
and is ‘not intended to operate in perpetuity.’	” (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 
237, 247, 248 (1991))). 
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changes. With segregation no longer attributable to the perpetrator, it 
is absolved of any continuing responsibility. As in the Civil Rights 
Cases, the Court overlooked the systemic and dynamic aspects of 
racial discrimination. Residential segregation had been “set by law for 
a period in excess of fifty years.”364 The notion that segregation in 
Oklahoma City would be fixed in the short five-year period—from 
the adoption of the 1972 decree, which mandated more aggressive 
integrative measures, to 1977, when the case was terminated—defies 
our understanding of how discrimination operates.365 The very idea 
reflects an assumption that discrimination ceases once it is declared 
unconstitutional. 
In Freeman v. Pitts,366 another school desegregation case, the 
Court applied Dowell’s weaker standard to hold that a district court 
could constitutionally release a school district from its supervision in 
incremental stages, before the district had fully eliminated the 
vestiges of prior discrimination in all facets of its operations.367 As in 
Dowell, the Court’s inordinate focus on time clouded its ability to 
perceive segregation’s adaptive qualities and how easily it could 
spread across a school system.368 “As the de jure violation becomes 
more remote in time,” the Court observed, “it becomes less likely that 
a current racial imbalance in a school district is a vestige of the prior 
de jure system.”369 Justice Scalia was more pointed in his observations. 
“At some time,” he noted in his concurring opinion, “we must 
acknowledge that it has become absurd to assume, without any 
further proof, that violations of the Constitution dating from the days 
when Lyndon Johnson was President, or earlier, continue to have an 
appreciable effect upon current operation of schools.”370 Once again, 
 
 364. Brief for Respondents, Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991) (No. 89-1080), 
1993 WL 340969, at *6. 
 365. Cf. Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437 (1968) (“It is against this background 
that 13 years after Brown II commanded the abolition of dual systems we must measure 
the effectiveness of respondent School Board’s ‘freedom-of-choice’ plan to achieve that 
end.”). 
 366. 503 U.S. 467 (1992). 
 367. Id. at 490–91. 
 368. For example, by focusing singularly on whether the district had eliminated 
discrimination in student assignment, it neglected to examine the dynamic interaction 
between student and faculty assignment. See, e.g., id. at 498. 
 369. Id. at 496. 
 370. Id. at 506 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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the Court assumed that time naturally purged racially discriminatory 
attitudes and behavior.371 
b. Shelby County v. Holder 
As discussed earlier, the 1965 Voting Rights Act responded to 
“ingenious and unremitting defiance” of southern states determined 
to deny voting rights—and thus political power—to African 
Americans. In enacting this law, Congress looked first to identify 
those jurisdictions “uniquely characterized by voting discrimination 
‘on a pervasive scale’	” and then to subject them to more stringent 
federal remedies.372 While not all of the areas necessarily used the 
same suppressive voting techniques, Congress understood the 
adaptive nature of voting discrimination that operated in the South 
and other regions. Importantly, Congress determined that 
jurisdictions with the most persistent records of discrimination tended 
to share two characteristics: (1) low rates of voter participation and 
registration and (2) the use of tests or devices that were transparently 
designed to prevent blacks from voting.373 
 Congress designed the resulting “coverage” provision to 
disrupt voting discrimination and to curb the use of evasive measures 
in the jurisdictions that satisfied these criteria. A separate 
“preclearance” provision required these covered areas to secure 
federal approval prior to adopting any changes to their voting laws.374 
Thus, Congress “reverse engineered” the coverage provision by 
adopting a metric that ensured repeat offenders would be subject to 
federal oversight and supervision.375 This approach allowed Congress 
to take direct aim at the ways in which voting policies and practices 
 
 371. Id. at 491–92 (majority opinion) (“[W]ith the passage of time, the degree to which 
racial imbalances continue to represent vestiges of a constitutional violation may diminish, 
and the practicability and efficacy of various remedies can be evaluated with more 
precision.”). 
 372. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2625 (2013). 
 373. The provision applied if the jurisdiction had used racially discriminatory tests or 
other “devices” as a voting prerequisite as of November 1, 1964, and if the jurisdiction had 
low voter registration or turnout in the 1964 presidential election. Id. at 2619. These “tests 
or devices included literacy and knowledge tests, good moral character requirements, the 
need for vouchers from registered voters and the like.” Id. Jurisdictions could “bailout” 
from coverage upon showing improvement in their voting practices, and a number of 
jurisdictions did bailout over the years. Id. at 2644. The Act was reauthorized in 2006. 
Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act 
Reauthorization and Amendments Act (Voting Rights Act of 2006), Pub. L. No. 109-246, 
120 Stat. 577 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§	1971, 1973 (2012)). 
 374. Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2619–20. 
 375. Id. at 2628. 
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mutated to advance racial discrimination.376 It also usefully allowed 
Congress to avoid the politically awkward situation of shaming 
jurisdictions by legislating federal oversight for them by name.377 In 
the heated civil rights battles, this political strategy was important. 
The Shelby County Court rejected Congress’s continued reliance 
on the same coverage formula used to identify discriminatory 
jurisdictions in 1965.378 For the majority, several facts meant that the 
formula was no longer “rational in theory or fact[:]”379 (1) registration 
and turnout rates among African-American and white voters, a 
source of concern at the time of the Act, now “approach parity;”380 (2) 
“minority candidates hold office” at levels no one imagined in 1965;381 
and (3) “blatantly discriminatory evasions of federal decrees are 
rare.”382 The majority concluded that Congress could not upset the 
delicate balance of power between the federal government and the 
states with a formula that had not been “updated” with more recent 
data.383 Therefore, the Act’s “extraordinary”384 departure from “basic 
principles”385 of federalism,386 which presumed that states would 
manage their own voting systems without federal interference,387 was 
not constitutionally justified.388 
 
 376. Id. at 2625 (“Congress chose to limit its attention to the geographic areas where 
immediate action seemed necessary.” (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 
301, 328 (1966))). 
 377. See Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 679 F.3d 848, 854 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (discussing this 
political tactic). 
 378. Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2631. 
 379. Id. at 2625. 
 380. Id. (quoting Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 202 
(2009)). 
 381. Id. 
 382. Id. 
 383. Id. at 2629. 
 384. Id. at 2628. 
 385. Id. at 2631 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 386. Id. (observing that if Congress “is to divide the States[,] [it] must identify those 
jurisdictions to be singled out on a basis that makes sense in light of current conditions”). 
 387. Id. at 2624 (majority opinion) (“States must beseech the Federal Government for 
permission to implement laws that they would otherwise have the right to enact and 
execute on their own	.	.	.	.”). 
 388. In so holding, the majority contrived a new doctrinal principle—that Congress had 
infringed the “equal sovereignty” of the states by subjecting some, and not others, to 
coverage under the Act. See id. But this rationale was particularly fraught given the prior 
settled understanding that Congress acted at the height of its power when it sought to 
remedy racial discrimination in voting. See Hasen, supra note 302, at 733 (noting 
conservative law professor and former Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Michael 
McConnell’s observation that the equal sovereignty principle was simply “made up”). 
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Nonetheless, Congress had good reason to believe that the 
coverage provision still targeted jurisdictions with the most significant 
discrimination.389 Although voter registration and participation were 
no longer the problems they once had been, racial discrimination in 
the covered areas persisted through adaptive practices that 
compromised minority voting strength in new ways.390 The legislative 
record compiled by Congress in support of the Act’s reauthorization 
in 2006 documented the extent of the problem.391 Overt 
discrimination had subsided,392 but a range of other racially 
discriminatory practices had surfaced in its place.393 The Court, 
however, determined that the record was insufficient.394 It dismissed 
evidence of “second-generation barriers” that did not (as in the prior 
Jim Crow era) block access to the ballot, but rather only diluted “the 
weight of minority votes.”395 For these Justices, focusing on such 
measures did not bolster the coverage provision, but “simply 
highlight[ed] [its] irrationality.”396 
 The Court’s inordinate focus on what it regarded as the 
coverage provision’s “outdated” features illuminates core flaws in its 
analysis. The provision’s crucial failing was that it relied on voting 
data from 1964 and “eradicated practices”397 that had been banned 
nationwide “for over forty years.”398 “[T]hings have changed 
dramatically” in the “[n]early 50 years since the [Voting Rights] Act 
was passed,”399 the Court observed. Because Congress had not 
 
 389. Id. at 738–42 (“[U]nder the Katzenbach rationality standard, there was ample 
evidence under which Congress rationally could have concluded that racial discrimination 
in voting remains a problem in covered jurisdictions	.	.	.	.”). 
 390. Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2635–36 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing “second 
generation barriers” to voting). 
 391. Id. at 2639–44 (discussing evidence of persistent racial discrimination in voting in 
areas covered by the Act); see also Hasen, supra note 302, at 738–42. But Hasen, supra 
note 302, at 742–43 (discussing political concerns expressed during the Act’s 2006 
reauthorization about the provision’s constitutionality). 
 392. But see Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2640–42 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (pointing to 
examples of intentional discrimination in the covered jurisdictions). 
 393. Id. at 2635–36. 
 394. See Hasen, supra note 302, at 714 (noting Shelby County’s “major doctrinal and 
jurisprudential change” that “demean[ed] the strength of Congress’s power to eradicate 
racial discrimination in voting”). 
 395. Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2629 (criticizing the dissent for “rel[ying] on ‘second-
generation [voting] barriers,’ which are not impediments to the casting of ballots, but 
rather electoral arrangements that affect the weight of minority votes”). 
 396. Id.  
 397. Id. at 2627. 
 398. Id.; see also id. at 2625–29 (discussing the “outdated” quality of the formula). 
 399. Id. at 2625. 
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sufficiently acknowledged that fact when it reauthorized the provision 
in 2006, the Court concluded that Congress had exceeded its 
authority.400 The standard applied in Shelby County—that “current 
burdens” must be justified by “current needs”401—makes the point. 
The metrics for racial discrimination must be grounded in the present; 
a formula tethered to the past is presumptively irrational.402 
By training so much of its attention on the passage of time, the 
Court overlooked the more meaningful question of whether the 
provision was still performing according to its original purpose, which 
was to block (reconstituted) voting discrimination in the worst-
offending jurisdictions. In 1965, the Act targeted areas with low 
registration rates and the use of discriminatory tests or devices 
because at the time they were the most relevant symptoms of the 
more systemic problem. To return to our human disease analogy, the 
Court’s error was to treat these symptoms as if they were the malady 
itself—the rash, rather than the underlying metastatic disease. Had 
the Court understood the constitutional inquiry differently, by 
concentrating instead on the persistence of adaptive discrimination, it 
might have realized the reasonableness of Congress’s decision to 
reauthorize the coverage provision. Instead, the Court’s framing of 
the constitutional requirement reduced voting discrimination to its 
constituent parts, rather than conceiving it as a whole system that 
mutates over time. 
The Shelby County decision was enormously consequential. By 
striking down the coverage provision, the Court disabled the only 
mechanism that had constrained voting discrimination before it could 
take root. Within hours of the decision, the state of Texas and other 
formerly covered areas announced their plans to reinstate measures 
that had been previously blocked.403 These measures included photo 
 
 400. Id. at 2631. 
 401. Id. at 2627, 2629. 
 402. Id. at 2629 (“Congress	.	.	.	must identify those jurisdictions to be singled out on a 
basis that makes sense in light of current conditions. It cannot rely simply on the past.”). 
 403. See, e.g., Sahil Kapur, Texas Advances Voter ID Law After Supreme Court Strikes 
Down Voting Rights Act, TALKING POINTS MEMO (June 25, 2013), http://talkingpointsmemo
.com/dc/texas-advances-voter-id-law-after-supreme-court-strikes-down-voting-rights-act 
[http://perma.cc/2BKD-25YJ]. See generally NAACP LEGAL DEF. FUND, STATEWIDE AND 
LOCAL RESPONSES TO THE SUPREME COURT’S VOTING RIGHTS ACT DECISION 
(2013),	http://www.naacpldf.org/files/case_issue/States%20and%20Localities%27
%20Responses%20to%20Shelby%20County%2C%20Alabama%20v.%20Holder%20as
%20of%202.18.2015.pdf [perma.cc/ZB8C-YGB2] (documenting voting discrimination by 
formerly covered jurisdictions); Gilda R. Daniels, Unfinished Business: Protecting Voting 
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identification laws, some of which apparently were designed to dilute 
the minority vote.404 By some accounts, the states’ use of these laws 
skewed the outcome of the 2014 midterm elections.405 
Shelby County, Dowell, and Freeman indicate how time 
considerations influence race jurisprudence in constitutional doctrine. 
Time-based justifications for terminating remedial measures are now 
so deeply engrained in our constitutional jurisprudence that we take 
them for granted. Indeed, time considerations were present even in 
Grutter v. Bollinger,406 the Court’s only equal protection decision 
squarely to uphold a race-conscious affirmative action plan.407 At the 
 
Rights in the Twenty-First Century, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1928 (2013) (discussing the 
impact that the loss of Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act has had on voting rights). 
 404. See Ross, supra note 107, at 380 (“Most tellingly, officials who supported voter ID 
laws or laws restricting early voting as purported anti-fraud measures recently either 
admitted that these laws in fact served racially discriminatory purposes or were exposed as 
purposefully callous to the laws’ discriminatory effects.”). Assertions that photo ID laws 
are designed to reduce voting fraud appear pretextual, given that in-person fraud is nearly 
non-existent. On the other hand, voting fraud by absentee ballot is far more common, 
although state legislators have been reluctant to address it. See, e.g., Sarah Childress, Why 
Voter ID Laws Aren’t Really About Fraud, PBS: FRONTLINE (Oct. 20, 2014), 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/why-voter-id-laws-arent-really-about-fraud/ 
[https://perma.cc/9WMH-HVWG] (observing that “[a]bsentee voters tend to be older and 
whiter than in-person voters” and describing state legislators’ reluctance to address fraud). 
 405. See BEN JEALOUS & RYAN P. HAYGOOD, THE BATTLE TO PROTECT THE VOTE: 
VOTER SUPPRESSION EFFORTS IN FIVE STATES AND THEIR EFFECT ON THE 2014 
MIDTERM ELECTIONS 1 (2014), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads
/2014/12/VoterSupression-report-Dec2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZRB7-NBBM] (“While 
the precise impact of strict voting laws on the results of the 2014 midterm elections is still 
unknown, it is clear that the number of people predicted to face increased difficulties in 
voting during this election either approaches or exceeds the margins of victory for 
competitive statewide races.”). Jealous and Haygood’s 2014 report “highlights the 
decreases in turnout [in the 2014 elections, as compared to] previous midterm elections in 
the three states—Texas, Alabama, and Virginia—that implemented [voter ID] laws for the 
first time in 2014.” Id. at 2; cf. Ingraham, supra note 57 (discussing conclusions drawn by a 
political science working paper documenting “substantial drops in turnout for minorities 
under strict voter ID laws” that were passed in the wake of the 2008 presidential election). 
But see Lynn Bonner, Democrats up in NC’s Early-Voting Turnout, NEWS & OBSERVER 
(Oct. 27, 2014, 10:42 PM), http://www.newsobserver.com/news/politics-government/state-
politics/article10109558.html [https://perma.cc/8SLK-3JWT] (noting the “spike” in early-
voting turnout in North Carolina during the 2014 elections). 
 406. 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 407. Id. at 328. Grutter was the first U.S. Supreme Court case since Bakke to address 
race-conscious admissions in higher education. See id. at 314 (describing Bakke as “this 
Court’s most recent ruling on the use of race in university admissions”). The Court in 
Bakke struck down the University of California at Davis’s consideration of race. 438 U.S. 
265, 320 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.). However, Justice Powell separately concluded that 
a diversity-based admissions policy could survive constitutional review if it was 
appropriately narrowly tailored. Id. at 311–12. 
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close of her majority opinion upholding a law school’s narrow use of 
race in admissions, Justice O’Connor intimated that affirmative action 
may no longer be necessary “in 25 years.”408 This reference led some 
of the dissenting Justices and other commentators to assume that the 
Court had set an expiration date for race-conscious student admission 
policies.409 
Each of these cases illustrates how the Court’s misplaced focus 
on time disguises discrimination’s adaptive dimensions.410 Only causes 
and effects that are knowable and neatly unfold within discernible 
periods count in the equal protection calculus. Causes and effects that 
are too remote in time are beyond constitutional remedy. 
III.  WHAT CAN LAW DO? 
The previous Part discussed the problems with constitutional 
doctrine and the Court’s cognizance of adaptive discrimination for a 
brief period following Brown. The discussion in Part II also examined 
law’s subsequent shift to a time-based narrative that weakened the 
constitutional justification for remedial measures. This Part asks 
what, if anything, law can do. It returns to the racial tragedy involving 
the fatal shooting of an unarmed black teenager by the police in the 
beginning of this Article. Section III.A addresses the question of 
whether progress is achievable given the nature of adaptive 
discrimination. Section III.B proposes changes to constitutional law 
that would enable the creation of adaptive enforcement methods. 
Section III.B outlines a more innovative, dynamic enforcement 
mechanism—one that involves courts, legislatures, and 
communities—to curb adaptive discrimination. 
 
 408. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343 (“We expect that 25 years from now, the use of racial 
preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest approved today.”); see also 
Vikram David Amar & Evan Caminker, 30 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 541, 550–54 
(discussing Justice O’Connor’s use of time in Grutter as reflecting a desire to “structure a 
constitutional transition period” to a “constitutionally preferable state of affairs” in which 
race-conscious admissions are no longer necessary). 
 409. See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 386 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“The Court 
suggests a possible 25-year limitation on the Law School’s current program.”). 
 410. See Michelle Adams, Causation and Responsibility in Tort and Affirmative Action, 
79 TEX. L. REV. 643, 647 (2001). 
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A. Is Racial Progress Possible? 
David Luban theorizes that all “[l]egal argument is a struggle for 
the privilege of recounting the past.”411 In the area of race, however, 
legal argument also requires space for narratives that allow us to 
“name our reality.”412 Existing constitutional doctrine demands that 
we see racial discrimination as narrow, siloed, and time limited. 
Accordingly, it looks past the systemic, dynamic, and regenerative 
effects of disbanded government policies and the private choices that 
such policies have enabled. 
All of this raises an obvious question, which is whether law can 
do anything. This question naturally flows from the very premise of 
adaptive discrimination—that public and private actors reengineer 
racially subordinating schemes that evade law, the effects of which 
persist through social norms and practices that look past the resulting 
racial disadvantage. Previous sections also explored the linear 
assumptions that are embedded in constitutional doctrine, which has 
curbed judicial and legislative remedies and affirmative action 
policies that sought to address pervasive racial inequality. Therefore, 
one might reasonably ask whether I have too much faith in the power 
of law (and in the willingness of those entrusted to implement it) as a 
tool for advancing racial justice. 
I vacillate between optimism and pessimism about the 
possibilities for law-based reform.413 For this reason, this Article has 
carefully suggested that adaptive discrimination may be “curbed,” 
rather than “remedied.” I use this distinction to convey some 
ambivalence about our ability to dislodge racial subordination and the 
utility of law as a means for undoing racial caste. Here I am 
channeling Professor Derrick Bell, who regarded the search for racial 
progress as something akin to a fool’s errand.414 Bell contended that 
 
 411. David Luban, Difference Made Legal: The Court and Dr. King, 87 MICH. L. REV. 
2152, 2152 (1989). 
 412. See Crenshaw, supra note 131, at 1336. 
 413. See generally id. at 1385–86 (discussing the “dilemma” presented to racial 
reformers by relying on liberal rights-based reform). 
 414. See Bell, supra note 23, at 79 (“Black people will never gain full equality in this 
country. Even those herculean efforts we hail as successful will produce no more than 
temporary ‘peaks of progress,’ short-lived victories that slide into irrelevance as racial 
patterns adapt in ways that maintain white dominance.”); cf. DERRICK BELL, FACES AT 
THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM 13–14 (1992) (“For too long, 
we have worked for substantive reform, then settled for weakly worded and poorly 
enforced legislation, indeterminate judicial decisions, token government positions, even 
holidays.”). David Luban has also echoed this view. See, e.g., Luban, supra note 411, at 
2152. 
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the centuries-deep evidence of black oppression indicates that blacks 
will be forever consigned to a permanent, subordinate status.415 He 
resisted the notion that racial struggle should be conceived as a quest 
for lasting progress. Instead, he urged that the purpose of struggle is 
to find meaning in the practice of resistance.416 As Bell conceived it, 
however, achieving that meaning requires abandoning the futile 
search for permanent equality, which he described as “more illusory 
than real.”417 
I agree with Bell that the long trajectory of racial subordination 
makes it impossible to have inordinate faith in the legal system.418 
However, I part ways with him on the view that racial progress over 
the long term is a lost cause and that the use of “law”—in the form of 
courts who enforce it, legal actors who implement it, and doctrine 
itself—for this purpose is senseless. While racial disadvantage is 
persistent and very real, we cannot credibly say that we have not 
made any progress.419 Nor can we afford to sideline courts in this 
project.420 Indeed, if we are to make meaningful headway, we must be 
able to draw on all instruments of law, including the courts, 
legislatures, elected officials, and, of course, the people themselves.421 
To state the obvious, not so long ago it was unimaginable that we 
would have a black president. Three-hundred years ago, it was likely 
inconceivable that slavery would eventually be declared 
unconstitutional. One-hundred years ago, few would have expected 
the Supreme Court to strike down de jure segregation. None of this 
just “happened,” of course. Progress unfolded through the 
 
 415. See Bell, supra note 23, at 79 (describing the permanence of black inequality as “a 
hard-to-accept fact that all history verifies”). 
 416. BELL, supra note 414, at 198 (discussing the search for “meaning” as the real 
“success” in racial struggle). 
 417. Id. at 13. 
 418. See Crenshaw, supra note 131, at 1349. 
 419. Id. at 1378 (“[D]espite these disparate results, it would be absurd to suggest that 
no benefits came from these formal reforms, especially in regard to racial policies, such as 
segregation, that were partly material but largely symbolic.”). 
 420. For a contextualized analysis of the role of law as a tool for racial justice, see 
generally id. at 1349–70 (discussing the pragmatic use of legal rights). Aspects of this 
Article also raise fundamental questions about the power of law to counter “[w]hite race 
consciousness” and whether the rule of law is capable of embracing the framework of 
adaptive discrimination when such an embrace necessarily challenges the very ideological 
system upon which law is based. Id. at 1375. A fuller exploration of these questions, 
however, is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 421. School desegregation programs have achieved some success through systemic 
enforcement. See James S. Liebman, Desegregating Politics: “All-Out” School 
Desegregation Explained, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1463, 1465–75, 1523 (1990). 
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generations due to resistance by untold numbers of people pushing to 
change laws and behavior in large and small ways. Thus, to make 
another crucial point, I do not harbor any illusions that change 
originates with law. Although a deeper exploration of these points is 
beyond the scope of this Article, social movements are also essential 
for legal reform.422 
At bottom, this Article takes the view that racial progress is 
possible. But progress, like discrimination, ebbs and flows over time. 
Therefore, we need to extend our time horizons in evaluating our 
relative success.423 As a practical matter, this means that law should 
treat racial discrimination as an endemic and complex problem that 
requires systemic, dynamic, and strategic responses and, just as 
importantly, indefinite vigilance.424 More fundamentally, we have to 
accept that the improvements we seek now may not bear fruit until 
we are long gone. 
We can analogize systemic racial inequality to climate change to 
help illustrate the point.425 The seeds of our current climatic activity 
were planted long ago, but the effects in many ways are only now 
becoming apparent.426 As with climate change, it will take significant 
time to reengineer and reconstruct our racial system. To do this, we 
need more innovative enforcement mechanisms that are as 
continuous, responsive, and fluid as the problem itself. Although a 
complete exploration of these points is beyond the scope of this 
Article, the next Section sketches the framework for this enterprise 
and the contours of what it might look like. 
B. Creating an Ecosystem for Racial Equality 
How might we advance an adaptive enforcement mechanism to 
create an ecosystem for racial equality in places like Ferguson, 
Missouri and the St. Louis metropolitan area? Such an expansive 
 
 422. See generally, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Channeling: Identity-Based Social 
Movements and Public Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 419, 419 (2001) (“The modern meaning of 
the Equal Protection Clause owes much more to the power and norms of the civil rights 
and women's liberation movements than to the original intent of the Fourteenth 
Amendment's framers.” (citing Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sexual Equality Under the 
Fourteenth and Equal Rights Amendments, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 161, 162)). 
 423. Cf. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW 406–07 (2011) (describing 
the mind’s limited capacity to process time in making decisions). 
 424. Cf. Crenshaw, supra note 131, at 1382 (discussing the strategic importance of 
making demands that lie within the institutional logic of the dominant discourse). 
 425. See Powell, supra note 227, at 797–98 (analogizing to climate change). 
 426. See Sterman, Climate Change, supra note 44, at 811–12. 
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project would necessarily involve the investment of federal, state, and 
local government resources and the attention of courts and 
legislatures, as well as individuals working within and across affected 
communities.427 As discussed earlier in this Article, each of these 
constituencies has had a hand in the creation of adaptive 
discrimination over a period of generations. Each must be involved in 
curbing its operation. 
This enterprise neither begins nor ends with constitutional law, 
as it first requires the willingness of each of the above actors to 
commit to the problem itself. This, of course, presents its own set of 
daunting political and practical problems. However, in key respects, 
constitutional law is also a barrier. It is an impediment to affirmative 
litigation against governmental actors insofar as it requires a specific 
showing of racially discriminatory intent. And it limits both the 
authority of federal courts to redress discrimination that has persisted 
through time and the power of Congress to target adaptive 
discrimination through legislation that burdens states and local 
jurisdictions. Thus, constitutional law both shields adaptive 
discrimination from the efforts of those who seek to eradicate racial 
inequality and provides those who champion such inequality with a 
sword against remedial measures that seek to address it, particularly 
at the federal level. This is a problem given that federal institutions 
and resources will need to be involved in this enterprise. 
The subsections below suggest ideas for navigating some of this 
terrain, and end by focusing on strategies that can be enforced by 
communities at the state and local level—largely free of the 
constitutional constraints identified earlier. I also briefly discuss some 
of the barriers to their implementation. 
1.  Clearing the Path to Systemic Change 
As the previous Sections discussed, constitutional law denies 
federal courts, Congress, and proponents of voluntary affirmative 
action the flexibility to respond to adaptive discrimination.428 This 
subsection proposes changes that would help clear the path for more 
 
 427. See Reva B. Siegel, Equality’s Frontiers: How Congress’s Section 5 Power Can 
Secure Transformative Equality (as Justice Ginsburg Illustrates in Coleman), 122 YALE L.J. 
ONLINE 267, 269 (2013), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/1138_rwjspe3e.pdf [https://perma
.cc/5Y4M-T5CB] (observing that “the interplay among social movements, democratic bodies, 
and courts” works together to create “new approaches to enforcing equality”). 
 428. See Rich, supra note 14, at 238 (discussing the benefits of divergence between 
constitutional and statutory law). 
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systemic reform in ways that align with the respective institutional 
capabilities of these various actors. 
For example, we can readily conclude that courts cannot 
realistically (or even appropriately) manage discrimination’s systemic 
and dynamic nature. In the context of the problems identified in this 
Article, courts are better suited for resolving challenges to specific 
institutional practices that foster racial inequality.429 Legislatures and 
government agencies, on the other hand, can study discrimination’s 
dynamic qualities and offer solutions that account for its complexity. 
The preclearance mechanism in the Voting Rights Act is a good 
example of an effective strategy and how it might work using the 
courts and the executive branch in a complementary enforcement 
framework. Though it has been disabled by the Court in Shelby 
County, Congress could still pass legislation that revives the provision 
using a different coverage formula. Moreover, there are no federal 
constitutional barriers for state legislatures to adopt the same kind of 
preclearance mechanism for their own state laws. However, as the 
federal preclearance provision itself shows, there are clear practical 
problems with relying on state legislatures to police themselves, 
especially (for reasons already discussed) with regard to racial 
discrimination.  
 As discussed throughout this Article, the Court’s express and 
implicit use of time as a sword against efforts to redress racial 
inequality is a continuing problem. The assumption that 
discrimination expires, or is no longer constitutionally cognizable, 
with the passage of time has led the Court to conclude that “de facto” 
racial segregation in public schools is beyond judicial remedy, to 
decide that Congress lacked constitutional authority to renew the 
Voting Rights Act’s preclearance formula, and to observe that 
diversity-based affirmative action may no longer be necessary in 
twenty-five years. The same assumptions about time underlie the 
Court’s determination that efforts to redress “societal 
discrimination”—which is “ageless in its reach into the past”430—
cannot be the basis for voluntary, race-specific affirmative action in 
 
 429. See Margo Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions over Time: A Case Study of Jail and 
Prison Court Orders, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 550, 555 (2006) (describing court orders as “one 
of the primary vehicles by which litigation has driven social change” and institutional 
reform). 
 430. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978) (opinion 
of Powell, J.). 
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higher education and government contracting or voluntary 
integration programs in K-12 public schools. 
Of course, time has been a factor even in constitutional decisions 
that favor an adaptive framework. Recall that the Court’s decision in 
Green invoked time in deciding that it was too soon to conclude that 
the school board had disestablished its dual system.431 And, in 
Katzenbach, the Court determined that Congress could 
constitutionally shift the advantages of “time and inertia” from the 
“perpetrators of evil” to its “victims.”432 
Still, for reasons already discussed, it is risky to legitimize time as 
a factor in adjudicating racial discrimination. Because discrimination 
mutates, it is easier to elude detection, which means that 
discrimination is likely to persist over some period. As demonstrated 
in the constitutional cases discussed earlier, accepting time as a 
consideration invites the possibility that it will be used to invalidate 
policies and practices that promote racial equality. Therefore, this 
Article calls for courts to abandon time, both as an explicit and 
implicit criterion, when judging the necessity of continuing 
discrimination remedies.  
The use of time as a factor in constitutional adjudication, 
however, will be difficult to overcome as long as intent is the standard 
and the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that present inequality is 
“traceable” to prior intent. The passage of time naturally makes it 
harder for the plaintiff to demonstrate (and a court to discern) an 
earlier decisionmaker’s motivation, as recollections of prior events 
dim and records documenting such proof are lost. 
Ideally, we would abandon racial intent.433 But, short of that 
scenario, we might look to Green for a possible solution. In Green, the 
Court shifted the burden to the school board to prove that it had 
eliminated “root and branch” the “vestiges” of its prior conduct.434 As 
the Court observed in Freeman v. Pitts, the “school district bears the 
burden of showing that any current racial imbalance is not traceable 
in a proximate way to [a] prior constitutional violation.”435 
 
 431. Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968). 
 432. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 328 (1966), abrogated by Shelby Cty. 
v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013). 
 433. For an explanation of how an intent-free standard would work in the context of 
school integration, we can look to Justice Powell’s concurrence in Keyes v. School District 
Number 1, 413 U.S. 189, 217–53 (1973). 
 434. See, e.g., Green, 391 U.S. at 439. 
 435. Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 494 (1992). 
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Of course, as discussed earlier, Freeman also unhelpfully 
concluded that white flight was not proximately related to past 
intentional discrimination,436 which limits its practical utility here. 
Nevertheless, the fact that the school board bears the burden of proof 
in desegregation cases changes the constitutional conversation by 
giving plaintiffs leverage to exact changes to school board practices 
that perpetuate racial inequality. The rebuttable presumption that 
continuing racial “imbalance” is connected to unconstitutional 
discrimination by the school district allows plaintiffs to negotiate 
changes to educational practices that harm black students and to 
require school districts to provide black students with more 
educational resources.437 
Ellen Katz describes comparable dynamics in the analogous 
context of Section 5’s preclearance model. Placing the burden on the 
defendant, rather than on the plaintiff, creates “an affirmative tool of 
governance”438 that, at least prior to Shelby County, enabled plaintiffs 
to challenge voting policies and practices that had a discriminatory 
impact while insulating government officials from some of the 
political pressures they might otherwise face not to “cave” to 
plaintiffs’ demands.439 An adaptive framework could apply the same 
burden to any public institution with a history of intentional racial 
discrimination. That institution would be under an affirmative 
obligation to show that the challenged practice was not traceable to 
its prior unconstitutional conduct. The benefit of this approach is that 
it hews reasonably closely to constitutional precedent. The 
disadvantage is that it remains tethered to findings of racial intent. 
Moreover, any remedies would be confined to the particular 
institution itself. 
The next subsection sketches components of an adaptive 
framework that would engage state legislatures, state courts, and state 
and local communities in this project. 
 
 436. Id. at 494–95. 
 437. See Holley-Walker, supra note 38, at 432–42 (discussing the educational benefits 
of integrated schools and recent developments in school desegregation cases). 
 438. See Ellen D. Katz, South Carolina’s “Evolutionary Process”, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 
SIDEBAR 55, 64 (2013), http://columbialawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Katz-
113-Colum.-L-Rev.-Sidebar-55.pdf [https://perma.cc/3FLE-K3VF]. 
 439. Id. (“[S]ection 5 shaped the development of a less burdensome policy without 
forcing state officials to spend political capital convincing the skeptical or hostile of 
anything beyond the measure’s compliance with federal law.”). 
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2.  Enforcement Strategies for Communities 
This subsection explores a set of interactive, dynamic strategies 
that could be implemented at the local and regional level.440 Because 
states have plenary powers over municipalities, they could require 
localities to comply with these enforcement mechanisms.441 The 
obvious drawback of course is that recalcitrant states could reject 
these mechanisms altogether, leaving localities that were otherwise 
receptive to such initiatives with minimal recourse.442 Indeed, as 
discussed throughout this Article, there is good reason to be 
concerned about whether states with a recividist history of racial 
discrimination would agree to racial justice initiatives at the local 
level. On the other hand, enforcement against states would require 
some federal intervention and could potentially raise some of the 
federal constitutional problems discussed in previous sections.443 
Thus, any proposal would have to be evaluated and weighed in light 
of these advantages and disadvantages. 
The mechanism that I contemplate here draws on a proposal by 
R.A. Lenhardt to use “race audits” to identify local policies and 
practices that perpetuate racial inequality.444 Again, we can look to 
the preclearance provision of the 1965 Voting Rights Act as a model 
for determining which jurisdictions would be subject to a race audit. 
As discussed above, the Act required certain jurisdictions with a 
history of persistent racial discrimination to submit any proposed 
voting changes for federal review. Under my framework, race audits 
would be performed in local jurisdictions and metropolitan areas that 
are symptomatic of adaptive discrimination. These symptoms might 
 
 440. Cf. R.A. Lenhardt, Localities as Equality Innovators, 7 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 265, 
270–75 (2011) (exploring the potential for equality innovation at the local level). 
 441. See Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907) (concluding that 
localities are creatures of the state and are subject to the state’s plenary power and 
authority). 
 442. See, e.g., New Orleans Campaign for a Living Wage v. City of New Orleans, 825 
So. 2d 1098, 1107–08 (La. 2002) (holding that state law barred local governments from 
establishing a minimum wage that applied to private employers). 
 443. See, e.g., Catherine Y. Kim, Changed Circumstances: The Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure and the Future of Institutional Reform Litigation after Horne v. Flores, 46 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1435, 1437–38 (2013) (discussing “heated [scholarly and political] debate” 
about the role of federal courts in institutional reform); David Schoenbrod, The Immortality 
of Equitable Balancing, 96 VA. L. REV. BRIEF 17, 18 (2010), http://www.virginialawreview
.org/sites/virginialawreview.org/files/schoenbrod.pdf	[https://perma.cc/ZV8A-CNRM] 
(arguing that judicial discretion “does no violence to legislative policy choices”). 
 444. See R.A. Lenhardt, Race Audits, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1527, 1534 (2011); see also 
Robert E. Suggs, Racial Discrimination in Business Transactions, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1257, 
1260–64 (1991) (providing a history of local policies contributing to racial inequality). 
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include, for example, high degrees of residential and public school 
segregation (intra- as well as interdistrict) and aggressive policing 
practices that target marginalized racial communities. How the 
jurisdiction allocates public resources and services and whether it 
concentrates the least desirable public facilities in distressed minority 
neighborhoods or towns would also be relevant. 
Localities and metropolitan regions that display these symptoms 
would be subject to a race audit. As conceptualized by Lenhardt, the 
audit team would bring together professionals and academics trained 
in the audit function, as well as community organizers and other 
affected individuals.445 This team would be tasked with uncovering 
practices that have fostered racial inequality and with making 
recommendations for curbing those practices’ present effects. 
Proposed government policies would also be evaluated for their racial 
impact. An “audit board” would design remedial measures that would 
take appropriate account of the adaptive nature of the targeted 
problems.446 Because adaptive discrimination often crosses 
jurisdictional boundaries, ideally the audit board would consist of 
both local officials and officials from the surrounding metropolitan 
area.447 
A court consisting of appointed judges, which was specially 
constituted to examine and enforce the audit team’s 
recommendations, would order remedies tailored to curb adaptive 
discrimination and preemptively bar implementation of other harmful 
measures. Because an adaptive enforcement model requires an active 
monitoring mechanism, the court’s jurisdiction would be indefinite, 
rather than time limited, and would span the full range of racially 
impacted systems. Further, the court would be empowered to take 
account of time delays in evaluating a policy or program’s relative 
success. The model contemplates that the court and the audit team 
would periodically revisit any solutions to reevaluate their 
effectiveness. 
 
 445. This form of community engagement could provide a democratic forum for local 
citizenry to exercise its voice and power around consequential matters of race. See 
Eskridge, supra note 422, at 419 (discussing social movement theory in relationship to 
law). 
 446. See generally, e.g., Sterman, Climate Change, supra note 44 (calling for an 
interdisciplinary approach to system dynamics). 
 447. For one model of how this might work, see GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING: 
BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT BUILDING WALLS 61–63 (2001) (discussing the use 
of regional legislatures). 
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A number of questions about the logistics of this enforcement 
system would have to be sorted out. One practical question is whether 
courts would have the power to enjoin local officials who refused to 
cooperate or comply with a race audit. Another question is whether 
localities would have recourse to appeal the orders of the specially 
constituted court. The audit team itself would also have to be 
appropriately staffed and monitored, which raises budgetary 
implications. Other political questions arise about how to constitute 
the audit board and its governance structure. 
How might we apply this framework to Ferguson? The account 
of adaptive discrimination in Ferguson and the surrounding St. Louis 
region described in Section I.B offers an example of what an audit 
team might uncover, as well as clues for diagnosing the reasons for 
persistent racial inequality in the town and the surrounding areas.448 
Adaptive enforcement measures might include a system of 
metropolitan zoning that would allow affordable housing to be sited 
throughout the region. Policies could be designed to address the 
intergenerational impact of poverty, such as intensive educational 
programs for both parents and children and various forms of funding 
to improve rates of homeownership among marginalized 
communities. The audit team could also make recommendations to 
improve relationships between the black community and the police, 
including the elimination of ticketing practices that target black 
residents. The monitoring mechanisms would have to be deployed to 
respond to any feedback effects that result from these policies. For 
example, we might imagine Ferguson shifting to new funding sources 
that continue to disadvantage the black community. The audit team, 
the board, and the court would have to remain active and alert to 
these kinds of adaptive strategies. 
3.  The Challenges of a Systemic Approach 
The framework described above has clear limitations that are 
inherent to systemic approaches.449 For example, enforcement likely 
 
 448. Indeed, a commission established to study the problems in Ferguson has already 
convened and issued a report. FERGUSON COMM’N, FORWARD THROUGH FERGUSON: A 
PATH TOWARD RACIAL EQUITY (2015), http://3680or2khmk3bzkp33juiea1.wpengine
.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/101415_FergusonCommissionReport.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/NC4T-NAP7]. 
 449. See David A. Graham, What Can the New Ferguson Report Achieve?, THE 
ATLANTIC (Sept. 14, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/09/what-can-the
-new-ferguson-report-achieve/405205/ [https://perma.cc/BZ3L-RNAE] (identifying political 
and practical problems with the implementation of systemic solutions). 
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would have to be carried out in ways that track institutional and 
organizational structures and processes, including matters of funding, 
implementation, and management. As a result, enforcement itself 
runs the risk of replicating the very problems that an adaptive 
framework seeks to address. Although an enforcement framework 
could require collaboration among and between government officials 
and private citizens to avoid some pitfalls, political and practical 
challenges are inevitable.  
In addition, law itself could use some cultural and professional 
reorientation in its approach to racial discrimination. Lawyers are 
trained to atomize problems—to break them down into their specific 
components according to relevant standards of proof and to align 
proposed remedies with available legal theories. Thus, law does not 
offer a “one-stop shop” for addressing racial discrimination’s systemic 
fluidity. Indeed, it is hard to imagine what that would look like. This 
is another reason why ongoing community engagement and feedback 
and continuing grassroots pressure on legal and political actors would 
be crucial to the success of an adaptive enforcement mechanism. 
Additional challenges might include a lack of resources and 
funding at the state and local level,450 requiring federal support and 
intervention. Moreover, the entities that comprise the race audit team 
could be readily captured by political interests or compromised by the 
very white privilege norms, racialized class ideologies, and implicit 
racial bias I discussed earlier. It is also possible that those subject to 
the enforcement mechanism would simply decide to exit the new 
order altogether by moving to another jurisdiction or reconstituting 
new communities under new sets of laws and rules.451 Thus, while the 
enforcement mechanism described here would allow useful and 
innovative techniques for addressing adaptive discrimination, 
additional work would have to be done to sort out its logistics and to 
reorient its participants on how to maximize its effectiveness. 
 
 450. But see Clayton P. Gillette, In Partial Praise of Dillon’s Rule, or, Can Public 
Choice Theory Justify Local Government Law?, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 959, 998 (1991) 
(“The higher costs that attend lobbying at the state level likely mean that fewer groups 
concerned with parochial issues will have a sufficient advantage to dominate at that 
level.”). 
 451. See, e.g., Myron Orfield, Milliken, Meredith, and Metropolitan Segregation, 62 
UCLA L. REV. 364, 377 (2015) (observing that homeowner associations helped to 
“effectively replace[]” racial zoning laws after they were struck down). 
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CONCLUSION 
We have made significant racial progress in this country. And 
yet, daunting problems remain. This Article has argued that these 
problems are a function of racial discrimination that is more complex 
than our limited cognitive models and constitutional doctrine allow 
and that public and private actors have been complicit in the creation 
and maintenance of our racially compromised systems. Our linear, 
time-centered approaches to addressing racial discrimination are 
destined to fail us, as they have again and again. 
Thus, our best hope for promoting racial justice is to embrace the 
precepts of adaptive discrimination. We must change the 
constitutional standards that prevent us from addressing it, and we 
must develop cross-institutional enforcement models that are more 
responsive to racial discrimination’s systemic and dynamic nature. 
Finally, we must accept that the quest for racial equality and freedom 
may continue for some time and that such a quest requires persistence 
and vigilance through the generations.  
